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FOREWORD
In 2003 the investment bank Goldman Sachs listed Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRIC) as the countries with the best prospects for development and 
the best chances to join the group of the world’s largest economies. Since then 
the BRIC acronym (made up of the first letters of the states’ names) has be-
come popular and the countries referred to by it have experienced unprec-
edented rapid growth. The strenght of their economies has been confirmed in 
the context of the global economic crisis, as all except Russia have managed 
to maintain thriving economic growth. The development of these markets 
pleases Germany, the world’s third largest exporter of goods. To illustrate 
the scale of the cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is 
enough to quote the data on Germany’s trade exchange. In 2000–2011 the 
share of Germany’s trade exchange with the BRIC states in overall German 
trade volume rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. The trade exchange between Germany 
and the USA in the same period was dominated by a reverse tendency; it fell 
from 9.6% to 6.2%.
In this report, the author presents the major trends in Germany’s economic 
cooperation with the BRIC countries and analyses the way in which the Ger-
man state supports the companies involved in trade and investment activi-
ties in these states. To investigate these processes, the method of economic 
analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC states 
isare principally employed. Additionally the talks with German experts 
were conducted. The figures quoted in this report have mainly been drawn 
from data bases kept by the German Federal Statistics Office and the Bun-
desbank. To analyse these figures, one needs to be aware of the methodology 
the German institutions use to collect information on trade flows. It should 
be remembered that they treat goods which reach the country through Ger-
man harbours as German imports, whereas their further resale abroad is 
registered as exports, and these flows should be classified as trade figures 
relating to third countries. So, it seems that the trade results calculated us-
ing this method are overestimated. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess 
what portion of these goods is further transferred to German manufacturing 
plants in Central and Eastern Europe.
Another major method used in compiling this report was the observation of 
political developments and analysis of documents prepared by the Ger-
man government. The information was complemented by data compiled by 
organisations grouping German export companies.
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The author decided to include Russia into this analysis, even though the his-
tory of relations between Germany and Russia is much longer than the his-
tory of relations between Germany and the rest of the BRIC states. Moreover, 
due to Russia’s geopolitical location, relations between Germany and Russia 
should not be analysed solely in the context of economic indicators, as they 
are strongly influenced by political and security factors quite different than 
those concerning China, India or Brazil. An analysis of German-Russian eco-
nomic relations and a comparison of them with the economic trends evident in 
Germany’s relations with Brazil, India and China will help us to better under-
stand the current changes in the perception of Russia by German elites. It can 
also help in finding a new perspective for analysing the changes in German-
-Russian relations, and in assessing the possible impact of strategic political 
relations on the development of economic cooperation.
The first part of the report contains an analysis of the evolving role of the state 
in supporting the activities of German companies on the emerging markets. 
Additionally, the analysis discusses the instruments which have been used 
to foster the development of economic relations and investment activities in 
the BRIC states, such as export and investment guarantees and development 
aid. The second part of the report is devoted to a comparative analysis and 
discussion of the condition of economic relations between Germany and the 
BRIC states, also with regard to their importance for Germany in the context 
of exports, imports, trade balance and foreign investments. The report also of-
fers an analysis of the situation of German companies operating in the BRIC 
countries, with special emphasis on both general trends and the changes ob-
served on individual markets. The Appendix discusses the political context of 
Germany’s relations with all the BRIC states, which cannot be ignored in the 
analysis of conditions for conducting entrepreneurial activities on the indi-
vidual markets.
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MAIN THESES
1. In the last decade, Germany’s exports to BRIC countries grew much faster 
than the volume of the EU sales to these markets. In terms of the EU ex-
ports to BRIC countries, Germany’s position has been much stronger than 
that of other EU states. In 2011 German exports accounted for 27.6% of the 
entire EU’s exports, while the German economy generates 20.5% of the EU’s 
total GDP. Statistics show that Germany is overrepresented in its share in 
exports to all BRIC countries except India. In 1999–2011 the Germany in-
creased contribution to the EU’s external sales volume on the Chinese mar-
ket from 35.6% to 47.5%, and on the Indian market from 17.9% to 26.9%. Par-
ticularly interesting is the fact that various political initiatives carried out 
in the last decade which focused on Germany’s cooperation with Russia, 
failed to significantly improve the position of German exporters compared 
with the remaining EU member states, and Germany’s share in the exports 
to Russia, in comparison with the other EU states, rose only slightly from 
30.2% to 31.8%. During the economic crisis, Germany’s exports to the BRIC 
states enabled it to compensate for the declining sales volume in those EU 
countries which were hit more strongly by the crisis than the emerging 
economies. The EU market continues to be the most important market for 
Germany. However, the BRIC countries can significantly compensate for 
the much slower growth observed on the EU market.
2. The Eurozone crisis has strengthened the role of Germany in the European 
Union and contributed to an improvement of Germany’s image worldwide as 
an EU leader. Germany is aware of this and wants to take advantage of the 
current positive international situation to solidify its current relations or 
launch new contacts with the most promising partners. It is no coincidence 
that inter-governmental consultations with China and India have been start-
ed right in the times of crisis. The ever more frequent visits paid by German 
politicians to China in particular should also be viewed in this context. The 
image of Germany as the EU leader, and at the same time a mediator of the 
BRIC countries’ interests in the EU, may contribute to the creation of a more 
promising system of economic cooperation for German companies, so that 
they can expect to encounter fewer political barriers to these markets. 
3. In the last decade, the importance of China for Germany’s economy has 
risen considerably, and the unprecedented dynamics of the development of 
economic relations has fostered the development of political cooperation. 
In the BRIC countries group, Russia has had a completely different status, 
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which results from it being an important supplier of mineral resources to 
Germany and an important political partner for Berlin. As far as coopera-
tion with India and Brazil is concerned, German companies hope for a sig-
nificant increase of trade exchange in the future, which would mean re-
peating the model for the development of relations applied in the case of 
China. From Germany’s point of view, what all these states have in com-
mon is the ambition to play the role of superpowers of at least regional im-
portance, aspiring to be important partners in the German foreign policy. 
The development of Germany’s relations with China should not lead to any 
decline in Germany’s relations with Russia, since in their relations with 
Germany these two states emphasise their different interests. Russia might 
have though relatively lower economic importance, while the other mar-
kets can be considered more attractive in terms of investment opportuni-
ties. The volume of trade exchange with other countries is likely to grow 
much faster, and the Russian resources may become less important to Ger-
many, both from the strategic point of view and in the context of the energy 
transformation currently underway in this country.
4. German companies have been intensifying their presence on the BRIC mar-
kets, and expect help from the German government in solidifying their com-
mercial relations and introducing legal acts which can facilitate their busi-
ness activity and reduce the political risk. Good political relations can guar-
antee better conditions for business expansion in the BRIC countries, as in 
each of them the state plays an important role regulating the entrepreneurial 
activity. These markets are characterised by stronger protectionist tenden-
cies, and the state offices are empowered to interfere in private business ac-
tivity. Germany has developed three major instruments to intensify its eco-
nomic relations with the BRIC countries: (1) the institutionalisation and crea-
tion of formal and informal networks of relations, (2) supporting businesses 
by means of export and investment guarantees, and (3) actions connected 
with development aid. In bilateral relations and in international cooperation 
initiatives, Germany has been pushing for the creation of favourable invest-
ment conditions for small and medium companies, and for the introduction of 
legal solutions to protect intellectual property. Export and investment guar-
antees help German companies to expand on the emerging markets and pro-
tect them against the consequences of the economic crisis and possible politi-
cal interference. Development aid, on the other hand, helps build up a positive 
image of the German economy and facilitates the pursuit of the sector-specific 
interests of individual companies, especially in the fields of green technolo-
gies, energy and in the healthcare sector. By taking part in projects focused on 
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the exchange of know-how and expertise, companies active in these sectors 
have opportunities to make valuable business contacts.
5. The largest portion of the German exports to the BRIC markets are goods 
manufactured by the usual export industries – the machine, automotive, 
electrical and chemical industries. The value of exports in each of these 
industrial branches, apart from the chemical industry, is higher than the 
export value generated by all the remaining sectors of Germany’s industry 
not classified in the ‘big four’. For this type of company, entering the emerg-
ing markets was unavoidable, as the investment opportunities in the old EU 
states had halted due to the much lower need to expand their infrastructure 
than in previous years. Moreover, the dynamic economic growth observed 
in the BRIC countries forced these sectors to become international, and in 
order to keep their status as global leaders many businesses had to expand 
to new, increasingly significant markets. The expansion of the large con-
cerns onto these markets has encouraged the small and medium companies 
that wanted to maintain their leader status in their specialist niche markets 
and uphold their relations with their major clients to follow in their foot-
steps. The dynamics and stability of economic relations between Germany 
and the BRIC countries will depend on the German companies’ potential to 
adapt to the changes occurring in the emerging economies. So far, German 
companies have been able to achieve commercial success due to their high 
levels of competence in producing machines and vehicles which were val-
ued in the process of these states’ ongoing industrialisation. However, the 
structural change of the emerging economies and their growing domestic 
consumption, which is expected to generate demand for consumer goods, 
could possibly cause problems. German companies which do not manufac-
ture such goods are likely to be forced to explore new markets.
6. For Germany the BRIC states have become not only significant partners, 
but also competitors. Some of them, China in particular, are important ri-
vals in the contest for access to mineral resources and rare earth elements. 
Research conducted in Germany has shown that by introducing instru-
ments involving export subsidies and import duties on raw materials, the 
BRIC countries are destabilising the global raw materials market1, as is 
1 Außenwirtschaftliche Maßnahmen der BRIC-Staaten zur Rohstoffversorgung am Beispiel 
von Kupfer, Deutsche Rohstoffagentur, Berlin 2012, http://www.deutsche-rohstoffagentur.
de/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/DERA_Rohstoffinformationen/rohstoffinfor-
mationen-12.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
10
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
evident in the case of the copper market, for instance. Germany has made 
the deepening of its cooperation with the BRIC countries conditional upon 
their progress in trade liberalisation. This is why Germany can be openly 
critical of these states when they violate the rules of free trade or directly 
interfere in German economic interests. Germany’s support for complaints 
filed with the World Trade Organisation against China, which had intro-
duced limits on the exports of rare earth elements necessary for the Ger-
man economy, is one example of this. 
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INTRODUCTION
Strengthening Germany’s global economic position in the times 
of crisis
The global economic crisis, which broke out first in the USA and then in the 
Eurozone, has boosted the political and economic power of Germany in Europe 
and worldwide. In 2009 it seemed that the German economy would be hard hit 
by the global slowdown. At that time Germany’s GDP fell by 5.1% – much more, 
for instance, than the GDP of France (-3.1%), the United Kingdom (-4%) or the 
USA (-3.5%). The issue of Germany’s excessive dependence on its exports began 
to be emphasised in political debates. Soon after this, however, when the coun-
tries of the European Union still could not overcome the slowdown, this struc-
tural German weakness suddenly turned into its biggest asset. The economy 
recovered quickly, and in subsequent years positive GDP figures were achieved 
and maintained, leaving the country’s major European competitors behind it. 
It turned out that other regions of the world performed better in working their 
way out of the crisis than the European countries, and Germany – being one of 
the world’s largest exporters – has benefited from this. 
The source of Germany’s success and the German economy’s increased focus 
on global expansion were not only the changes in the global situation, even 
though the ongoing industrialisation of the developing economies has fostered 
the increase in the demand for investment goods  manufactured by German 
companies. The most important change which led to the accelerated develop-
ment of the economy were the internal reforms carried out in Germany be-
tween 2003–2005 by the government headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 
known as Agenda 2010. The modernisation was based on the liberalisation of the 
labour market and the reduction of unemployment benefits and of the period 
for which they could be paid out. As a result, industry in western Germany was 
relieved from the obligation to support a large mass of unemployed people in 
the former GDR, which had considerably limited its competitive potential. The 
side effect of the modernisation processes was a stagnation of the labour costs, 
which persisted for many years and further helped to speed up the expansion 
of German companies on foreign markets. These changes were very important 
because they contributed to a rapid fall in Germany’s unemployment rate. The 
proportion of unemployed fell in the years 2005–2011 from 11.7% to 7.1% in the 
entire country, and from 21.1% to 13.3% on the territory of the former GDR. It 
then appeared that the number of people out of work had fallen, despite the 
EU’s enlargement to include new member states from Central Europe.
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The positive economic figures enabled the politicians to launch a fight against 
fears of globalisation, quite widespread in Germany, and the perspective of 
a possible loss of jobs caused by globalisation. As late as 2006, some 47% of Ger-
mans considered globalisation to be mainly a risk, whereas only 20% consid-
ered it an opportunity2. Most Germans associated this process with possible 
job losses resulting from employment moving abroad and from growing social 
inequalities. Only in recent years did Germans begin to believe that German 
companies could benefit from the process of integration of the global economy. 
According to polls carried out in 2011, up to 64% of Germans considered glo-
balisation positive. A certain paradox was present in the German perception of 
globalisation, since at the same time 55% of Germans believed that their coun-
try’s GDP could grow faster without the impact of globalisation. Apart from 
the usual fear of the growing social disparities, an opinion was often quoted 
that the globalisation processes could have negative impacts on climate and the 
environment3. On the other hand, this was the reason why Germany, a coun-
try which aspires to play an important role in climate protection initiatives, 
became involved in devising global understandings concerning these matters.
The global economic crisis has drawn the attention of German elites, who so 
far had mainly been interested in European integration, to the emerging econ-
omies. It appeared that in the times of global economic slowdown they have 
been able to generate demand which could – at least in part – compensate Ger-
man exporters for a declining sales volume in Europe. For the German economy 
there is no turning back from the path of globalisation. In 2003–2008 Germany 
was the world’s largest exporter, but it lost this status to China in subsequent 
years. In 2008 exports accounted for nearly 40% of Germany’s GDP, which is 
twice as much as 20 years earlier and much more than in other economies of 
similar size. Between 1999–2011, up to 20% of Germany’s economic growth was 
generated by its trade surplus. 
During the government of Helmut Kohl (in the early 1990s) tendencies to sup-
port China were present in German politics, especially after the events on Tian-
anmen Square. Few people in Germany, however, had expected China to grow 
as dynamically as it did in the following ten or fifteen years. During Gerhard 
Schröder’s second term in office (1998–2005) Germany saw a clearer per-
spective of cooperation with the BRIC countries. The social-democratic 
2 Globalisierung: Die mesiten sehen mehr Risiken als Chancen, Institut für Demoskopie Al-
lensbach, 2006, http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/uploads/tx_reportsndocs/prd_0611.pdf, p. 2. 
3 http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/nachrichten_109784.htm 
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government decided to assume a more pragmatic approach to the issue 
of economic cooperation especially with China and Russia, putting ques-
tions of democratic values aside. The then German chancellor was commit-
ted to strengthening the competitive status of German companies by tighten-
ing political relations with foreign partners, and so he began to visit Asia more 
often. Representatives of the German economy were particularly interested in 
developing stronger relations with Beijing, appreciating the Chinese econom-
ic growth rate. To increase German companies’ chances of success, Schröder 
hardly ever criticised China, and even supported the plan to lift the EU’s em-
bargo on the exports of weapons to China and adopted a plan to hold regular 
meetings with Chinese leaders once a year. 
After the initial resistance observed in her first term in office, in her 
second term Chancellor Angela Merkel consistently followed the strat-
egy of deepening political and economic cooperation with China, India 
and Brazil, as well as with smaller states in South-East Asia. Originally, 
she had adopted a more cautious approach to cooperation than her predeces-
sor, especially with non-democratic states; this resulted in a deterioration 
of Germany’s relations with China when Merkel refused to take part in the 
opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. Some time later, 
however, even she became convinced that closer cooperation with the BRIC 
countries might enable Berlin to pursue its global goals in the long-term per-
spective, including preventing climate change, limiting uncontrolled migra-
tion and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and jointly fighting terrorism and 
ensuring energy security4. Additionally, a plan to prepare an agenda of global 
problems was supposed to help Germany to tighten its relations with the BRIC 
countries. One argument used to convince Chancellor Merkel to become 
involved in cooperation with the developing economies was the prospect 
of the increased importance of international forums, and the formation 
of the G20 group to shape the agenda of global economic problems. It was 
expected that the possible increase in the number of benefits of globalisation 
would be strongly supported by government programmes. Since 2009, when 
the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition was in power, four ministries (those of foreign 
affairs, the economy, development aid and education) have published strate-
gies for cooperation with the emerging economies. This was a response to ap-
peals by business circles to open up Germany for cooperation with these states 
to a greater extent. The number of ministries involved in intensifying relations 
4 G. Schröder, Warum wir Peking brauchen, http://www.zeit.de/2008/30/China 
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with the emerging economies was proof that Germany treated these issues as 
priorities and was working to prepare a comprehensive and long-term strategy 
concerning these matters. The new concepts called for the far-reaching econo-
misation of instruments such as foreign, development, educational and cul-
tural policy, in order to facilitate German companies’ business activities on the 
emerging markets. The creation of an image of Germany as a country commit-
ted to defending the liberalisation of the global economy was intended to serve 
this purpose as well. Germany managed to identify the risk associated with 
the growing crisis-related protectionism in international trade exchange early 
enough, and on the G20 forum it strongly defended the idea of free movement 
of goods in the global exchange, as well as the widest possible liberalisation of 
trade exchange. Germany also tried to block the protectionist actions that the 
European Union had launched towards China (among others), and protested 
against the plan prepared by the EU commissioner for industry to introduce 
limits on non-EU investments in Europe’s strategic sectors.
The crisis has boosted Germany’s global political importance because this 
country has become the key initiator of the resolution of the Eurozone’s prob-
lems and the main payer which helped to stabilise the situation of highly in-
debted countries. This was particularly important to China, which retained 
significant euro currency reserves in its investment portfolio, along with 
government bonds issued by many indebted EU countries. China considered 
the period of the currency union’s problems a favourable moment to start its 
expansion in Europe. Beijing noted the growing disparity between the econ-
omy of Germany, which maintained its growth dynamics, and the economy 
of France, which was characterised by stagnation and troubled by structural 
problems. So, China began to consider Germany as the most important partner 
in its relations with the European Union and the main sales market for Chinese 
exports. Examples confirming the change in German-Chinese relations are 
the successive meetings between Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chinese lead-
ers, during which ways of combating the Eurozone crisis and a possible pur-
chase of bonds issued by the most heavily indebted countries were discussed. 
On the other hand, Beijing treated the German chancellor as a mediator in the 
relations between China and the EU when the European Commission threat-
ened to introduce penal duties on Chinese solar installations in 2013. Leaders 
of the remaining emerging economies, such as India or Brazil, have also begun 
to see Berlin as the main player in the EU. These changes in the perception 
of Germany fuelled Berlin’s ambitions to shape the agenda of global economic 
management, for instance on the G20 forum. Upon reconsideration of its as-
sets – such as the country’s good global reputation, the power of its economy, its 
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high level of technological advancement, the potential of German companies 
and its good relations with the world’s most promising economies – Germany 
concluded that it might able to influence matters of global importance, such as 
methods for combating the financial crisis or preventing climate change. To 
this end, Germany decided to include the economies they considered the most 
attractive, i.e. China and India, into the group of their partners in bilateral 
consultations. This has also proved that Berlin wants to deepen its political 
relations with these countries, and hopes that good relations with them will 
make it possible for Germany to defend its interests on international coopera-
tion forums such as G20 or the United Nations.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITY 
OF GERMAN COMPANIES IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES
When German companies decided to enter the BRIC markets, no special 
support from the federal government was necessary, and their business ac-
tivity mainly involved the sale of goods on these markets. Currently more 
and more jobs in Germany have become dependent on the rate of economic 
growth in the BRIC states, and many German companies have begun to car-
ry out major investments in those countries. Entrepreneurs expect the gov-
ernment to offer help in deepening inter-state relations and in introducing 
legal and technical standards to facilitate business activity and reduce po-
litical risk. The latter issue is of great importance in all BRIC countries, as 
the state plays an important role in regulating the economy in each of them. 
The German elites have also noticed that the development of economic re-
lations goes hand in hand with Germany’s increasing potential to influ-
ence the policy of these states, which expands opportunities to cooperate 
with them within various multilateral cooperation initiatives. Another of 
Germany’s ambitions is to improve conditions for doing business in these 
countries, as it expects them to become an important source of German in-
dustrial production growth in the context of the Eurozone crisis. With its 
stronger position in Europe, Germany hopes to further influence the pro-
cess of reducing trade barriers, and to foster the liberalisation of the BRIC 
economies.
1. Concepts for cooperation with emerging economies
Germany’s growing international ambitions and its willingness to intensify 
its relations with the emerging economies have been reflected in the grow-
ing number of German initiatives focused on cooperation with these partners. 
Based on the experience gathered so far, and the changes provoked by the 
crisis, Germany is committed to preparing a comprehensive programme 
of intensifying political relations with the BRIC countries and improving 
cooperation with them on forums such as the UN, G20 and IMF.
The first concepts focused on deepening cooperation with the emerging econo-
mies were sector-specific strategies prepared by individual German ministries 
without any general coordination on the part of other institutions. As early as 
2010, the German Ministry of the Economy published a detailed plan for 
increasing political support for German small and medium companies 
operating abroad (“The foreign economic offensive: How to use global 
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opportunities”5). The ministry emphasised both the projects aimed to boost 
Germany’s attractiveness as a place to locate investments in, and the political 
support offered to German companies which could otherwise have had problems 
in expanding their activities to the emerging markets. As part of this plan, the 
ministry intended to carry out activities such as the following: simplifying and 
shortening the procedure to obtain a work permit for the most talented foreign 
workers; conducting ‘sports diplomacy’ to win contracts for German compa-
nies related to the organisation of sports events (such as the 2014 World Foot-
ball Championships, or the 2016 Summer Olympics organised in Brazil). Greater 
emphasis was to be placed on supporting branches other than the usual ones, 
i.e. companies from the sectors of transport, healthcare, security technologies, 
defence, aviation and energy. The new instruments to achieve these goals in-
cluded global promotional campaigns emphasising the advantages of Germany 
as a place to locate investments in; events aimed at facilitating German compa-
nies’ new contacts with foreign partners; plans to simplify and shorten the pro-
cedures of granting support to these companies and increase funding for export 
guarantees; creating an institution focused on supporting German investments 
abroad (in the form of advice, financial and political support); expanding the 
network of chambers of commerce; and the active representation of Germany 
during international trade fairs. Additionally, the ministry planned to create 
a clear cooperation framework for German companies operating abroad by con-
tinuing the work on liberalising global trade, as well as signing bilateral free 
trade agreements. The project mentioned the energy dialogue as an area for co-
operation with Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
The changes in German foreign policy towards the emerging economies also 
concerned development policy. When the FDP politician Dirk Niebel took of-
fice as the Minister for Development Aid and Cooperation, he attempted to 
combine the support for the most underprivileged countries with the aims 
of German foreign and defence policy. Example of such activities include his 
visits with foreign minister Guido Westerwelle to countries such as South Af-
rica, Tanzania, Djibouti6 and Egypt7, and an agreement signed by his ministry 
5 Die Außenwirtschaftsoffensive. Chance nutzen weltweit, Bundesministerium für Wirt-
schaft und Technologie, Berlin 2010, http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/aussen-
wirtschaftsoffensive-2010,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
6 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2010-04-14/niemieckie-interesy-w-afryce
7 A. Ciechanowicz, J. Gotkowska, Niemcy wobec rewolucji w Afryce, BEST OSW, No. 9(169), 
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warszawa 2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
best/2011-03-09/niemcy-wobec-rewolucji-w-afryce-polnocnej 
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with the Ministry of Defence on carrying out development projects in those 
countries in which the Bundeswehr was conducting its operations8. This was 
a confirmation of a new concept of development policy, which since that time 
has become closely tied with Germany’s economic interests and foreign policy. 
The ideas on how to reach this goal were included in the new strategy adopted 
by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (responsible for 
development aid). 2011 saw the publication of the concept for cooperation 
with strategic partners, including Brazil and India, referred to as global 
partners in development aid9. It covered those states which play a key role in 
solving global problems at the G20 forum, due to their industrial and geopoliti-
cal importance. Attention was paid to the growing importance of new emerg-
ing economies with a large industrial share, with which Germany has more 
and more in common in terms of security, economy or climate issues (e.g. at the 
G20 forums). Due to the persistently high level of poverty in these states, it was 
suggested that German development aid could be used to stimulate cooperation 
in order to better protect the climate and support institutional and economic 
transformation in these states, which is likely to facilitate German companies’ 
business activities in the future. These goals are consistent with Germany’s 
economic interests. The concept recognises the necessity to involve Ger-
man companies in development aid to a larger degree, as this can make it 
easier for them to initiate new contacts in these countries later on. It was 
recommended that civil society organisations took responsibility for 
dealing with traditional aims of development policy, such as combating 
poverty, and carried out their actions in a way that would complement 
the tasks performed by the ministry. The most important partners men-
tioned in the document in the context of this process were Brazil, India, Indo-
nesia, Mexico and South Africa, a list that can be further expanded to include 
other countries characterised by dynamic development. The selection of these 
states is consistent with German plans to intensify its economic cooperation 
with a smaller group of emerging economies, but on a larger scale. This strat-
egy suggests that the development aid outlays earmarked for Brazil and India 
are likely to grow dynamically in the next couple of years. Germany wants to 
draw from its experience in China, and use sector-specific and increased funds 
to support German companies in their expansion onto these markets. This will 
8 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2011-06-15/niemiecka-polityka-rozwojowa-
we-wspolpracy-z-bundeswehra
9 Konzept der entwicklungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit mit Globalen Entwicklungs - 
p artnern, http://www.bmz.de/de/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier-
 305_06_2011.pdf 
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be further facilitated by the federal government’s commitment to achieving 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, and increasing the share 
of development aid from the current 0.39% of GDP to 0.7% of GDP in 2015. In 
recent years attempts to fulfil these commitments have gained momentum (in 
1997–2004 Germany allocated only 0.27% of its GDP to development aid). 
Greater emphasis on cooperation with emerging economies is also evi-
dent in the German concept of foreign cultural and educational policy 
(“Foreign cultural and educational policy in the times of globalisation: 
winning partners, transferring values, representing interests”10) pub-
lished in 2011 by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The concept high-
lights the fact that in the context of growing globalisation pressures, apart 
from maintaining its old alliances in Europe Germany should build new part-
nerships which could support it in solving global problems, for example at the 
UN forum. The document mentions India as an example of a country which is 
receiving relevant support from German education and cultural policy insti-
tutions in the form of co-funding for German language lessons in 1000 schools 
and the organisation of a Germany Year. Germany’s cooperation with China 
(partnerships between universities and campus building) and Brazil (build-
ing the German House of Knowledge and Innovation in São Paolo and organis-
ing a Germany Year in Brazil) are similar in nature. Further, the concept sug-
gests using certain instruments more frequently in cooperation with foreign 
partners. These include educational cooperation (promoting German language 
courses, cultural policy); developing foreign educational policy (preparing ac-
ademic syllabuses for foreigners and introducing a new scholarship system); 
coordinating the activities of German foreign organisations with projects car-
ried out by educational and cultural institutions; and intensifying the use of 
modern forms of communication to maintain the positive image of Germany 
in foreign media. The scale of the change of perspective in German foreign cul-
tural and educational policy can be proved by the fact that, in a parliamentary 
question filed with the Bundestag, SPD deputies accused the Federal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of transforming this policy into another instrument used to 
pursue Germany’s interests and intending to fully control this policy11. 
10 Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung: Partner gewinnen, 
Werte vermittleln, Interessen vertreten, Ausärtiges Amt, Berlin 2011, http://www.aus-
landsschulnetz.de/wws/bin/300902-303206-2-akbp-konzeption-2011.pdf 
11 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/098/1709839.pdf 
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One of the major documents illustrating the change in the federal gov-
ernment’s approach towards cooperation with the emerging economies 
was the concept paper entitled “Shaping globalisation – Expanding part-
nerships – Sharing responsibility”12. This was the German government’s 
first attempt at creating a comprehensive strategy for cooperation with 
the emerging economies. The document’s authors quite frankly declared that 
it was an offer of cooperation sent to the new regional powers (the emerging 
economies) which are not members of the EU, G8, NATO or OSCE, but which 
have a special status in their regions associated with their power or economic 
potential and their ability to play an important role in their neighbourhood 
and worldwide13. The document discusses Germany’s attempt to tighten its re-
lations with these countries to create a stable, multilateral system based on 
clear rules and supported by efficient institutions. The new vision of coopera-
tion with the emerging economies had been present in previously published 
sector-specific strategies, but it was this document that combined them in one 
initiative and outlined the new concepts for cooperation. Germany wants to 
build new cooperation formats and networks with these countries focused on 
specific issues in order to achieve greater stabilisation of bilateral relations 
and have an influence on their policies. Germany aspires to represent the EU 
in relations with the emerging economies. The following possible fields of such 
cooperation are often mentioned: 
•	 security and peace;
•	 human rights and the rule of law;
•	 economy and finance;
•	 resources, food and energy;
•	 labour, social issues and healthcare;
•	 sustainable development.
The document highlights the fact that the economic crisis has fostered 
stronger connections and a greater institutionalisation of Germany’s re-
lations with the emerging economies, i.e. through cooperation on the fo-
rum of the UN, G20 or OECD; this tendency is worth strengthening. Ger-
many also plans to use the instruments offered by the European Union (the EU’s 
strategic partnerships, the European External Action Service). According to 
12 Globalisierung gestalten – Partnerschaften ausbauen – Verantwortung teilen: Konzept der 
Bundesregierung, Bundesregierung, Berlin 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/
servlet/contentblob/608384/publicationFile/169957/Gestaltungsmaechtekonzept.pdf 
13 A. Ciechanowicz, K. Popławski, Niemiecka koncepcja zwiększenia korzyści gospodarczych 
z globalizacji, BEST OSW, No. 9(210), Warszawa 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
best/2012-02-29/niemiecka-koncepcja-zwiekszenia-korzysci-gospodarczych-z-globalizacji 
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the document’s authors, the improving relations with the emerging economies 
should translate into signing contracts and facilitating the German companies’ 
access to this market. This can be achieved by using the instruments aimed to 
support German companies operating abroad, and by pursuing an appropriate 
trade policy. These contacts could also be used to promote political, social 
and economic goals, such as further trade liberalisation, and to set clear 
rules of supporting exports in order to avoid dumping, ensure stable sup-
plies of raw materials, promote the development of renewable sources of 
energy and prevent global epidemics. The document also emphasises that 
the possibilities of citizens’ organisations and entities not directly linked 
with the state have as yet not been explored to a sufficient degree. This 
sphere of contacts generates great potential for increasing the variety of forms of 
cooperation and the efficiency of foreign policy. To this end, measures of cultural 
and educational policy could be used in the form of support for the exchange of 
representatives of cultural and civil society organisations. One example of this 
kind of cooperation is the Asia-Europe Meetings project, as part of which meet-
ings with experts from emerging economies are organised. Initiatives focused 
on promoting German culture in countries which Germany is mostly interested 
in and the promotion of their culture in Germany could also be elements of such 
actions. Examples include the organisation in Germany of the Vietnam Year in 
2010, the India Year in 2011 and the Chinese Culture Year in 2012. 
2. Development aid
Development aid plays an important role in supporting German econom-
ic relations. Even though the funds allocated to individual states are just 
a small portion of their GDP, they create a positive image of Germany and 
channel the aid to those specific sectors which are particularly attractive 
to German companies. One example of such cooperation is found in Germa-
ny’s relations with China. Germany launched closer cooperation with China 
as early as 1982, and offered it development aid which helped the Chinese to 
combat poverty and provided them with renewable energy development tech-
nologies. Germany has continued to provide this aid in recent years, offering 
help in eliminating the effects of natural disasters and promoting the positive 
image of Germany. The 20th anniversary of German development aid to China, 
organised by Beijing, was an opportunity to break the deadlock in diplomatic 
relations which occurred after Angela Merkel had refused to take part in the 
opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. German aid is highly 
valued in China, and frequently results in an inflow of new technologies to the 
country (Germany was the second largest donor after Japan).
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Figure 1. Inflow of German development aid to BIC countries
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The figures relating to German development aid provided to Brazil, China and 
India (no aid was granted to Russia) suggest that in the last decade, and in 
particular under the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, the amount of funds allocated 
to support these countries has increased. It should be noted, however, that on 
average 35% of these funds are transferred to the beneficiaries via multilateral 
organisations. For example, in 2010 the Federal Ministry of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development directly financed projects worth €190 million in China, 
€396 million in India, and €150 million in Brazil. 
An analysis of the thematic scope of the projects currently carried out by 
Germany in China, India and Brazil clearly shows that the aid is highly 
sector-specific and strongly focused on the development of renewable en-
ergy sources, environmental protection technologies, energy projects (in 
all of these countries) as well as economic development and promotion of 
the rule of law (particularly in China). Recent years have seen an increase 
in Germany’s development aid outlays directed to India and Brazil (which is 
consistent with the German strategy of raw materials partnerships).
Before 2010 China could count on the largest portion of support, which amount-
ed to over US$430 million per year. 2010 was the last year in which China re-
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ceived development aid. This decision was taken in response to criticism of 
giving support to a state which in the eyes of public opinion is no longer con-
sidered a developing country, and could soon become Germany’s competitor 
in global trade. This decision was preceded by a period of generous support to 
China, which had been the second largest recipient of aid from Germany after 
Iraq14. However, this change does not mean that Germany plans to withdraw 
from its current projects, which are to continue until 2014. Large sums of aid 
were allocated to India, on average amounting to US$260 million per year. Fur-
thermore, in the case of Brazil the value of development aid rose in 2008–2010, 
and on average amounted to US$90 million per year.
India is a good example of using the development aid it received from Germany 
to pursue strategic interests. Between 1958 and 1997 Germany allocated India the 
amount of 17.3 billion deutschmarks as development aid. In recent years, how-
ever, this aid was re-channelled from supporting the healthcare system to the 
development of green technologies and modernisation of installations generat-
ing energy from renewable sources15. What India has to offer is a large and very 
promising energy market; today only 700 million out of 1.2 billion of India’s citi-
zens have access to electricity grids16. This is why KfW Entwicklungsbank has 
been supporting India in developing renewable energy solutions since 1999. In 
India Germany is currently carrying out a project entitled ‘Solar Roofs and Ger-
man Schools and Institutions Abroad’, initiated by the German Energy Agency 
(DENA). As part of this programme, the German company IBC Solar plans, in co-
operation with a local partner, to install 35 solar modules with a total capacity of 
7.8 kW at the Goethe-Institut in Bangalore. Germany has been cooperating with 
India on the Indo-German Energy Programme (IGEN) carried out by the Ger-
man Society for Technical Cooperation and India’s Ministry for Energy. As part 
of this undertaking, Germany provides India with help in the form of consulta-
tions, engineering services and technical support for the Indian energy sector17. 
14 Ch. Geinitz, Ende der Entwicklungshilfe: Noch immer fließt Geld nach China, 2010, http://
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/ende-der-entwicklungshilfe-noch-
immer-fliesst-geld-nach-china-11043481.html 
15 Ch. Wagner, Die deutsch-indischen Beziehungen, Note du Cerfa, Nr. 84, 2011, p. 5.
H. Lienhard, Rede an der Jahrestagung der Deutsch-Indischen Handelskammer am 27. Mai 
2009, Asien-Pazifik Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2009, http://www.asien-pazifik-
-ausschuss.de/downloads/positionen/Rede_Lienhard_IGCC_2009.pdf, p. 11.
16 http://www.dresden.ihk.de/servlet/veranstaltung?veranst_id=5166&duva_id=11380&ref_
knoten_id=3050&ref_detail=ver, p. 5.
17 H. Lienhard, Rede an der Jahrestagung der Deutsch-Indischen Handelskammer am 27. Mai 
2009, Asien-Pazifik Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2009, http://www.asien-pazifik-
ausschuss.de/downloads/positionen/Rede_Lienhard_IGCC_2009.pdf, pp. 5–6.
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Germany’s relations with Brazil have been characterised by close cooperation 
in the field of climate policy. In Brazil a large portion of energy is generated by 
renewable energy sources; 85% of electricity comes from hydroelectric power 
stations. Recently Brazil organised a climate conference in Rio de Janeiro. Ger-
many cooperates with Brazil in the field of climate protection, and is commit-
ted to developing its exports of wind power technologies to this country. Ger-
many has been trying to use development aid organisations to promote 
the development of wind and solar energy along with the relevant legal 
solutions enabling the implementation of these technologies in Brazil. 
An interesting example was the conference organised in Brazil by the German 
Ministry of the Economy in cooperation with the Development Aid Company 
(Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) dedicated to the development of 
the solar energy market in Germany in 200918. According to the German press, 
the concept – calling for the construction of a stadium in Brazil which would 
be powered by solar energy – has been inspired by German experiences. In 
spite of controversies over whether Brazil should still be considered a country 
needing development aid, Germany continues to support it. Data compiled by 
the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development show that in 2011 Ger-
many allocated €108 million for this purpose, which accounted for 3.2% of the 
funding spent by Germany on bilateral cooperation, and made Germany the 
second largest donor after Japan. One of the key ideas behind German develop-
ment aid is to pave the way for private capital19. This is why the major projects 
involved support for the development of solar installations and wind power 
stations. The aid was also supposed to finance initiatives connected with the 
organisation of sports events – Germany’s co-funding of street football cham-
pionships is one example of this20. 
3. The system of guarantees limiting political risk
The state plays an important role in all BRIC countries and is strongly involved 
in steering the economy, and it is therefore necessary to protect German com-
panies from political risk. Export and investment guarantees are impor-
18 F. Specht, Brasilien: Mit deutscher Hilfe zur ‘Green Economy’, 2012, http://www.handels-
blatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/brasilien-bei-sonnenschein-laeuft-der-stromzaehler-
rueckwaerts/6700982-2.html 
19 http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2012/oktober/20121016_brasilien/in-
dex.html 
20 http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2011/september/20110911_pm_153_
brasilien/index.html 
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tant instruments of assistance, which are especially welcomed by small 
and medium companies which cannot afford to generate losses on foreign 
activities in the situation when political risk arises. 
The German state offers entrepreneurs five types of financial support:
7. State export guarantees (the so-called Hermes covers). This instrument is the 
major form of export support provided by Germany, the main aim of which 
is to protect the companies and their foreign business activities against po-
litical and economic risk. Germany considers that the private sector does 
not offer sufficient instruments for supporting companies in case of political 
risk, in particular in the states which are not OECD members, and that this 
gap should be filled in by the state. The broad application of this instrument 
also resulted from the necessity to keep up with foreign competitors which 
receive support from their states and could gain competitive advantage over 
the German companies. Germany is committed to shaping an appropriate 
and uniform legal framework for providing this type of help to the private 
sector, and is active in a number of initiatives, within the OECD in particular, 
in which environmental protection and the avoidance of corruption and ex-
cessive debt in the poorest countries are questions of key importance. 
8. Investment guarantees are expected to help companies protect themselves 
against political risk associated with investing abroad. This is a particular-
ly important instrument which can be used when companies are entering 
new, developing markets.
9. Non-binding state financial credits (the so-called UFK), instruments used 
to support German strategic interests, including: 
a. projects aimed to secure the supplies of raw materials to Germany; the 
state can use this instrument to support the extraction and transport 
of raw materials to Germany. In such cases it can insure the political 
risk, and since 2008 it has been allowed to insure the project’s economic 
risk as well. There is one condition, however: the parties applying for an 
UFK are obliged to sign a long-term supply agreement; 
b. support granted to banks which offer loans to small and medium enter-
prises in the former Eastern Bloc countries; this instrument was meant 
to support the financing of these companies and protect them against 
political and economic risk in Central and Eastern Europe;
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c. loans provided for projects serving Germany’s special economic inter-
ests in bilateral relations, launched only at the request of the German 
chancellor. So far, these loans have been used for providing financial 
support for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, and 
for supporting the Eurozone countries via the International Monetary 
Fund during the recent crisis.
10. Guarantees provided to eliminate fluctuations in interest rates, offered to 
contractors cooperating with German shipyards, and available since 2008. 
This was supposed to be a special form of assistance for debt-ridden ship-
yards, helping them to win new contracts and eliminating the burden as-
sociated with the costs of debt.
11. Guarantees provided for the purposes of development cooperation, as 
a form of guarantees supporting major development aid projects. German 
companies can receive help in the form of payments to cover a part of the 
credit interests, or in the form of state-guaranteed loans. 
In 2012 the German state provided entrepreneurs with export guarantees 
to the amount of €29 billion, making up 2.6% of German exports21. The 
guarantees are provided mainly to entrepreneurs entering new markets, 
in particular small and medium companies. Over 87.5% of the guarantees 
have been provided to companies which export goods to the emerging 
markets22. Of this sum, €715 million were provided to support the exports of 
goods in the sector of renewable sources of energy. According to analyses pub-
lished by German research institutions, in 2000–2009 these guarantees made 
it possible to maintain some 141,000 jobs in the German economy, and in 2010 
this number rose to 240,000 jobs23. Around a quarter of these jobs were actu-
ally in the BRIC countries. The largest beneficiaries of this type of assistance 
have been the machine, chemical and electro-technical sectors, which have 
received 85% of the total support. Half of the support was granted to small and 
medium enterprises. In a survey, two-thirds of the companies interviewed de-
21 Exportkreditguarantien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Jahresbericht 2012, http://
www.agaportal.de/pdf/berichte/jb_2012.pdf 
22 Investitiongarantien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Direktinvestitionen Ausland: Jah-
resbericht 2011, http://www.agaportal.de/pdf/dia_ufk/berichte/dia_jb2011.pdf 
23 Beschäftigungseffekte der Exportguarantien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ifo Institut, 
Monachium 2011, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/hermesde-
ckung-zusammenfassung,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
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clared that they probably would have lost their contracts to other companies 
had they not received the guarantees. 
The decision to provide the guarantees is taken by an inter-ministry commit-
tee composed of representatives of the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Co-
operation and Development (responsible for development aid). The committee 
can consult experts in specific fields, and the major role in the decision making 
process is played by the Ministry of the Economy. 
Figure 2. Total value of export guarantees – the so-called Hermes covers – 
provided to German companies operating in the BRIC countries 
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Source: http://www.agaportal.de 
Recent years have seen the steady growth of the value of export guaran-
tees in China, India and Brazil. In the case of Russia, a rapid decline of 
the value of guarantees in 2008–2009 was evident; however, this trend 
has been reversed in subsequent years. German companies operating in the 
BRIC countries are the largest beneficiaries of the German export guarantees. 
In the period 1991–2009, German companies operating on the Russian market 
received the largest portion of the support (export guarantees amounting to 
€26.5 billion), with companies on the Chinese market ranked second (€26.1 bil-
lion euros), companies on the Brazilian market ranked fourth (€16.4 billion eu-
ros), and those active on the Indian market eighth (€10.5 billion)24. 
24 http://www.60jahrehermesdeckungen.de/flash/top10laender.html 
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In the case of export guarantees, these funds are usually used to secure large 
transactions, and in this way limit their risk and reduce the banks’ costs of fi-
nancing them. This is also a means of protecting small and medium companies 
against a potential loss of revenues which could make them go bankrupt. In 
Brazil, a large portion of the guarantee funds has been used to secure short-
term receivables. In China, on the other hand, in 2011 most of them were used 
to warrant smaller transactions, some of which were made in the steel and 
paper industries. In 2011 in India, €219 million were spent to secure a trans-
action associated with a manufacturing plant expansion, and €209 million to 
equip steelworks. In 2011 in Russia, €586 million provided as guarantees were 
allocated to the sale of 54 German regional route trains, and €496 millionto the 
supply of assembly lines for manufacturing plants. 
Another important instrument supporting the expansion of German enter-
prises is investment guarantees aimed at helping companies to finance and 
secure those of its investment projects associated with political risk which is 
difficult to estimate. The procedure for providing investment guarantees re-
sembles that of granting export guarantees, with one exception – a separate 
committee is responsible for it. In 2012 Germany provided the German en-
terprises with new investment guarantees for 100 projects carried out in 
44 states to a total amount of €6.1 billion, which has increased the overall 
value of German guarantees to €66.4 billion. In this way, the overall sum of 
possible guarantee-related financial obligations of the state rose to €31 billion. 
To be able to put greater financial resources at the disposal of the companies, 
in 2012 the government increased the total value of guarantees from €40 billion 
to €50 billion.
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Figure 3. Total value of guarantees provided for German direct investments 
in individual countries in specific years
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Source: Investionsguarantien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, KfW Bank
The sum of the guarantees provided for investments carried out in Russia is 
the highest, which might suggest that the Russian market is perceived as the 
most risky, and that the state needs to encourage companies to invest on this 
market. The scale of the guarantees provided increased significantly in 2008, 
i.e. after the introduction of limits on German investments on this market in 
2007. According to some experts, German banks are reluctant to finance any 
involvement of German companies on this market, due to the political risk 
which is difficult to estimate.
Germany is aware of the necessity to provide enterprises with assistance 
in times of crisis on the BRIC markets. In 2012 the largest number of the 
approved applications for support was filed by companies investing in 
China, Russia and India, and the largest sum of guarantees was granted 
to them. The guarantees are flexible, and have the potential to stabilise the 
companies’ business activities, which is proved by the fact thatat the begin-
ning of the crisis in Europe 2008, around 85% of the guarantees were provided 
to the BRIC countries, accounting for an increase in the number of new guar-
antees of 124%. In 2010, in the period of the ‘Arab Spring’, however, 50% of the 
new guarantees were provided to African states, which meant an increase of 
286% compared with the previous year. 
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II. GERMANY’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BRIC 
COUNTRIES
In recent years the German exports to the BRIC countries, China and India in 
particular, have been growing at an above-average rate compared with the Eu-
ropean Union’s foreign sales on these markets. The years 2005–2012 in par-
ticular brought an accelerated growth of sales to the BRIC markets. In 
terms of imports, on the other hand, the growing importance of China 
and Russia has been observed. This was reflected in the German trade bal-
ance. In the case of China it has deteriorated considerably. A negative trade 
balance has also been observed in the case of Russia. Germany has achieved 
a trade surplus in its economic relations with India, while trade with Brazil 
appeared to be balanced. 
The development of the BRIC states has resulted in an increased interest 
by German companies in investing in these countries. Notably, there has 
been an evident surplus in the flow of capital from Germany compared 
with the reverse direction. Considerable dynamics in the flow of German 
capital has been observed, especially on the Chinese, Russian and Brazilian 
markets. The reverse capital flows have been much lower. Only Russia can be 
considered an important investor on the German market.
1. The growing importance of the emerging economies  
for the German economy
In the period preceding the crisis, the expansion of German companies on the 
emerging markets had already brought significant economic benefits, as the re-
sult of rapid economic growth in these countries, high oil prices and an invest-
ment boom, especially in Asia which had imported many investment goods (e.g. 
machines) from Germany. This was the reason why in 2010, 83% of the growth 
in the machine, automotive, electrical and chemical sectors was generated in 
the BRIC countries. In the period of crisis, exports to the developing countries 
diminished to a lesser degree than exports to developed countries. This was pos-
sible thanks to a healthy banking system in these countries, a more responsible 
economic policy, higher currency reserves and high raw material prices. 
Almost a third of the growth in German exports in 2000–2007 were generated 
by increased sales on the emerging markets. In this period German exports to 
the emerging markets developed at an above-average rate. Exceptions to this 
rule included exports to countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Singa-
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pore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines25. In 2005–2010 Ger-
many’s total exports grew by 21%. In the same period, though, sales to the BRIC 
states rose five times faster – by as much as 107%26. 
Investment goods account for a large portion of German exports to the devel-
oping countries. Half of the growth in German exports of investment goods 
is generated by these countries27. Germany has benefited from the rapid de-
velopment in these states and their commitment to modernising their in-
frastructure and industrial base. This has been particularly favourable to 
the German electro-mechanical and chemical sectors. In addition, German 
automotive companies have experienced very dynamic growth in the BRIC 
countries.
Figure 4. The share of countries28 characterised by different income levels  
in the global economy in 2011
Developing countries
23.7%
Other states 
35.7%
USA and the Eurozone
40.6%
Source: Next Eleven: die Zweite Reihe der Schwellenländer, Handelsblatt, 13 March 2012, p. 7
The crisis has confirmed the growing importance of the emerging economies 
for the global economy. In 2011 eight dynamically developing countries, Brazil, 
25 Deutsche Exporte: Wachstumstreiber Schwellenländer, IWD Nr 35, Informationsdienst des 
Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2010, p. 4.
26 BRIC-Staaten: Deutsche Firmen gut im Geschäft, IW Köln, Pressemitteilung No. 28/15, 2011, 
p. 1
27 Deutsche Exporte: Wachstumstreiber Schwellenländer, op. cit.
28 Developing countries include Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, Vietnam, South Africa, Turkey 
and Indonesia.
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Russia, India, Mexico, Vietnam, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia, had a 24% 
share in the global industrial output. This proportion suggests that if Germany 
wants to maintain its large share in the global exports, it must continuously 
strengthen its presence on these markets.
Figure 5. The share of countries characterised by different income levels  
in the generation of global growth in 2011
Developing countries
35.7%
Other states 
40.0%
USA and the Eurozone
24.3%
Source: Next Eleven: die Zweite Reihe der Schwellenländer, Handelsblatt, 13 March 2012
An even more important role is played by these countries in generating eco-
nomic growth. In 2011 these countries’ share in global production growth was 
36%, and the proportion is expected to rise further. From Germany’s point of 
view, this means that the country’s involvement on these markets will guaran-
tee a strong position for German producers in the future. 
2. Germany’s trade with the BRIC countries
Compared with the other EU states, Germany has had a strong position 
in the exports of goods to the BRIC countries. In 2011 German exports ac-
counted for 27.6% of the total EU exports, whereas Germany’s GDP makes up 
20.5% of the EU economy. This makes Germany overrepresented in exports 
to the BRIC countries excluding India. The adoption of the euro has turned 
out to be positive for German exporters as it eliminated the competition among 
the Eurozone countries, which otherwise could have manipulated their cur-
rency exchange rates. In the past, Germany’s European competitors were able 
to compensate for salary increases by weakening their currencies, which has 
become impossible in the common currency system. 
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Figure 6. Germany’s share in total EU exports to individual BRIC countries
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A look at Germany’s share in the total exports to the BRIC countries in 1999–
2011 reveal that since the adoption of the common currency, German exports 
have risen considerably compared with the other EU states, especially on the 
Chinese and Brazilian markets. Germany has managed to increase its share 
in the EU foreign sales on the Chinese market from 35.6% to 47.5%, and 
on the Indian market from 17.9% to 26.9%. Interestingly, various politi-
cal initiatives focused on cooperation with Russia carried out in the last 
decade, such as the partnership for modernisation, have not led to any 
significant improvement in the situation of the German exporters com-
pared with those from other EU states, and Germany’s share in the EU’s 
exports to Russia increased only slightly, from 30.2% to 31.8%. The worst 
dynamics of Germany’s exports share were observed on the Brazilian 
market, where it fell slightly from 32% to 31.3%. 
Figure 7. Germany’s share in the EU imports from individual BRIC countries
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Germany’s stronger position in EU exports to the BRIC countries has not been 
reflected in similar changes in the import figures. Compared with the EU aver-
age, a more dynamic growth of imports is noticeable only in the case of Bra-
zil. In spite of the significant growth in Germany’s exports to China, there has 
been no increase in Germany’s share of EU imports from China. 
Figure 8. Germany’s exports to the BRIC countries
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Source: Federal Office for Statistics
Germany’s exports to the BRIC countries have been rising dynamically, but 
the speed of this process has not been identical on all these markets. Russia 
and China are particularly interesting, as in recent years they have become 
increasingly important markets for the sales of German goods. However, it 
should be remembered that Germany’s exports to China has been exceptional-
ly good, compared with the entire EU exports, but the exports of German goods 
to the Russian market has been characterised by average performance. The pe-
riod of the economic crisis has brought entirely different trends: in 2009 an 
acceleration of Germany’s exports to the Chinese market was observed, while 
the Russian market experienced a rapid decline, although German exporters 
managed to overcome it by as late as 2011. This was caused by the stronger de-
pendence of Russia, compared with the other BRIC countries, on the exports 
of raw materials and the economic situation in the EU. Germany’s exports to 
India and Brazil have been developing at a similar, stable pace, especially since 
2005. Exports to Brazil accelerated in 2003 after years of stagnation, while the 
figures reflecting exports to India rose gradually in the last decade, with a cer-
tain acceleration of growth in the last few years. 
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Figure 9. Germany’s export dynamics on selected markets in 2007–2011
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Source: Federal Office for Statistics
An analysis of the growth rate observed in the largest countries in the group 
of emerging economies shows that in 2007–2011 there was a massive growth 
of sales on these markets. German exporters have noted a two-fold increase in 
their sales to China, and an around 50% increase in the sales achieved in Brazil 
and India. Exports to Russia rose at a slower pace due to the greater impact of 
the global slowdown in that country. Compared with the figures for the BRIC 
countries, the EU market has experienced stagnation.
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Figure 10. Germany’s imports from the BRIC countries
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German imports are characterised by similar tendencies to its exports. A dy-
namic growth in imports from China has been observed. The growth was only 
negative in 2009, during the most serious economic slowdown in Germany 
since the end of World War II. Also in the case of Russia, the import figures 
grew dynamically in the last decade, although since 2006 the pace of growth 
has been subject to greater fluctuations. Imports from India and Brazil have 
been growing slowly, but still their volume is much lower than in the case of 
Russia and China. 
From the German point of view, what all BRIC countries have in common 
is their large investment potential resulting from their need to modern-
ise their economies. This in turn generates demand for investment goods, 
which are the flagship products of the German economy.
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Figure 11. Structure of Germany’s exports to the BRIC countries 
Machine
Automotive
Electro-technical
Chemical
Other
[%]
30
22
17
15
17
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Source: Ch. Römer, Marktposition der deutschen Wirtschaft in den BRIC-Staaten, IW-Köln Trends, 
No. 3/2011, p. 9
The structure of German exports to the BRIC countries seems to con-
firm this thesis. The major role is played by the traditional branches of 
the German export, i.e. the machine, automotive, electro-technical and 
chemical industries. Each of these industries (apart from the chemical) ac-
counts for a higher value of the exported goods than the exports of goods pro-
duced by industrial sectors other than the ‘big four’. For this type of company, 
entering the emerging markets became unavoidable, as investment demand 
had stagnated in the old EU countries due to the much weaker needs for infra-
structure modernisation. Moreover, the dynamic economic growth in the BRIC 
countries has in a way forced these companies to expand onto foreign markets, 
and many of them, in order to remain global leaders, have had to move to new 
markets which are increasingly promising in the global perspective. Pressure 
on the part of large corporations was the third element. In Germany there ex-
ists a network of very strong relations between companies promoting long-
term partnerships. This is why the expansion of large German corporations 
onto the emerging markets forced smaller suppliers to follow their customers, 
otherwise they would have lost some of their major sources of income.
Figure 12. The share of German products in the BRIC countries’ imports
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No. 3/2011, p. 9
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A comparison of the share of the four major branches of the German industry 
in the BRIC countries’ imports shows that the main source of Germany’s suc-
cess is the strong position of its automotive and machine industries. In the case 
of China, the German automotive industry provides 30% of vehicles imported 
to this country, whereas in the remaining BRIC countries Germany delivers 
10–20% of the total imports. A similar role is played by the machine industry, 
which accounts for 15–20% of the machines these countries import. Notably, 
the machine industry is important for Brazil, which imports fewer German 
goods in the other import categories. The electro-technical industry has a large 
share of Russian imports, and accounts for a significant portion of this type of 
goods imported by India and Brazil. The chemical industry is of major impor-
tance for the volume of goods imported by Russia and Brazil. 
Figure 13. Germany’s trade balance in relation to the BRIC countries
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An analysis of Germany’s trade balance with the BRIC countries brings inter-
esting conclusions. In the case of China and Russia, Germany’s trade balance is 
negative. China is an important producer and supplier of sub-assemblies 
to Germany. Goods manufactured in China are frequently transported to 
Germany, where they become components of high-technology products. 
Another reason is China’s strategy of subsidising exports and maintaining low 
production costs. During the crisis, however, China came in for criticism, es-
pecially by the United States, for artificially supporting its exports. Therefore 
in the future Beijing may be forced to change its economic development model, 
which is currently based on low wages. This will probably contribute to a lev-
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elling of Germany’s trade balance with China, as suggested by the significant 
increase in German exports to China and a certain stabilisation of Chinese im-
ports onto the German market. 
Russia is also playing an important role in Germany’s economic model; it is 
a guarantor of supplies of raw materials to Germany. German politicians and 
enterprises consider Russia a country which is more closely related to Germa-
ny in cultural and political terms, and can offer safer supplies of raw materi-
als than the countries located in the Middle East or North Africa, which are 
characterised by high political risk. This is why there is a significant surplus 
in Russia’s trade with Germany. 
Germany’s negative trade balance with Russia has inspired German politicians 
to propagate the idea of partnership for modernisation. Its official aim was to 
supply technologies to Russia to modernise its economy in exchange for great-
er stabilisation of the business environment and an opening-up of the mar-
ket to investors by introducing simplified procedures for investments carried 
out by small and medium enterprises; the protection of intellectual property; 
greater scope for unification of technical standards; and the development of 
a low-emission economy. In fact, all these aims could bring benefits to German 
companies and contribute to a reduction of the deficit in Germany’s trade with 
Russia.
Brazil and India purchase more goods from Germany than they sell in 
Germany, which means there is a surplus in Germany’s trade with these 
countries. What is notable is the reversal of this trend; until 2004 Germany 
maintained a balance of exports and imports in its trade relations with India, 
which in recent years has begun to shift towards a proportion that is more pos-
itive for Germany. In the case of Germany’s trade exchange with Brazil, there 
are no clear conclusions, as the trends reversed after years of trade surplus, 
and today seem to be regaining balance. 
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3. The balance of Germany’s direct foreign investments  
with the BRIC countries
Germany is an important supplier of capital to the BRIC states. This coop-
eration is asymmetrical because none of these countries is able to balance 
the German investments by a similar scale of capital flows in the opposite 
direction. German companies are significant investors which create jobs and 
supply high-quality, technologically advanced products.
Figure 14. Accumulated German direct investments in the BRIC countries 
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Source: Bundesbank
The flow of German investments to the BRIC countries is subject to different 
trends than foreign trade. From the German point of view, the BRIC coun-
tries are an attractive area to locate investments in due to their large 
populations, absorbent markets, rapid economic growth and growing 
purchasing power. China used to systematically receive larger amounts of 
German capital. This tendency rose sharply in 2002 and continued to rise in 
the following years, with the exception of 2011. For some time, the dynam-
ics of the inflow of German investments to the Russian market was similar 
to that observed on the Chinese market. In the case of Russia the critical year 
was 2007, when the global financial crisis broke out. It is evident that German 
investors could have feared a decline on the Russian market, similar to that 
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which happened during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. Russia’s war with 
Georgia and the subsequent poor performance of the Russian economy made it 
impossible to regain the trust of German investors, despite the partnership for 
modernisation project promoted by Germany. In the 1990s Germany invested 
much more in Brazil than in the other BRIC countries. In 1997–2003 the scale 
of the investments began to be limited due to the reduction of privatisation 
programmes as well as the crisis in Asia and South America in the late 1990s29. 
In later years the investments began to rise again, and it is estimated that they 
may now exceed the scale of Germany’s involvement in Russia, especially in 
the context of the expected contracts for the construction of sports facilities 
planned to be built in Brazil in connection with the 2014 World Football Cham-
pionships and the 2016 Olympics. Germany’s investments in India have been 
growing very slightly for many years. Their growth accelerated in 2006, which 
can be attributed to the expectations of rapid economic development of India 
in the years to come. 
Figure 15. Accumulated investments of individual BRIC countries in Germany30
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29 Deutsche Direktinvestitionen in Entwicklungs- und Reformländern am Beispiel der BRIC-
Länder, http://www.agaportal.de/pdf/dia_ufk/presse/dia_exkurs_bric.pdf, p. 1.
30 No data is available for India’s direct investments in Germany before 2006.
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An analysis of capital flows from the BRIC countries to Germany shows that 
these countries are unable to balance the capital which they receive from Ger-
many with similar investments on the German market. These countries’ dis-
tant geographical location of reduces their interest in investing in Germany. 
In this context Russia can be seen as an exception, as it has considerably in-
creased the scale of its investments in Germany (especially since 2005), and in 
this category holds the status of a leader in the BRIC group.
4. Recent expansion of German companies on the BRIC markets 
A brief consideration of German companies’ sales figures, employment indi-
cators and the number of German companies operating in the BRIC countries 
reveals that the role of these states has increased very rapidly, which is par-
ticularly evident in the cases of China, Russia and Brazil.
Figure 16. Turnover of German companies in the BRIC countries
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Source: Bundesbank
Data compiled by the Bundesbank shows that in recent years the turnover of 
German companies has risen sharply in almost all BRIC countries. The success 
of the German businesses on the Chinese market is particularly worth not-
ing. In 2004–2010, German companies’ turnover increased three-fold to reach 
€120.4 billion. German companies operating in Russia and Brazil have also ex-
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
43
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
perienced dynamic growth, albeit not as spectacular as that observed in Chi-
na. In 2010 their turnover in Russia rose to €54.7 billion, and in Brazil to €58.3 
billion. The situation on the Indian market was more stable; in 2010 German 
companies operating in India sold goods worth €18.6 billion. 
Figure 17. Number of German companies operating in the BRIC countries31
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An analysis of figures concerning the number of German companies operating 
in the BRIC markets seems to suggest similar changes. The most dynamic in-
crease was observed in the number of companies conducting business in China 
– up to  1582 in 2011, and amounted to around  500 in the remaining countries. 
The most dynamic expansion has been observed on the Russian and Indian 
markets. 
31 The data relates to companies with a minimum turnover of €2 million and owned by Ger-
man investors in at least 10%. The data excludes a portion of companies carrying out invest-
ments in China. 
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Figure 18. Number of workers employed in the BRIC countries32
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Source: Bundesbank
Almost identical trends may be observed in relation to employment figures, 
which rose at the fastest pace in China, to reach 500,000 employees. In Russia 
the number of individuals employed with businesses owned by German inves-
tors in at least 10% rose to 246,000, in India to 214,000 and in Brazil to 233,000.
In the future we can expect various trends to emerge in relation to employ-
ment. On the one hand, protectionist tendencies might gain importance in 
the dynamically developing countries as a result of the financial crisis, which 
would be likely to limit Germany’s expansion onto these markets. German 
manufacturing activities carried out there could also be threatened by the 
dynamically rising labour costs. On the other hand, however, Germany may 
expand its activities and change the structure of its investments in these coun-
tries. If this is the case, German companies could limit the growth of produc-
tion on these markets, and increase the scale of their investments focused on 
research and development. Investment plans announced by Germany’s largest 
chemical concern BASF can be seen as a harbinger of the latter scenario. In 
32 Data relates to companies with annual turnover of at least €2 million euros, owned at least 
in 10% by German investors. The data does not include employment figures relating to Ger-
man manufacturing plants on the territories of these countries, which are much higher. 
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March 2012 BASF announced that it would increase the share of its outlays for 
research and development in the developing states from 24% to 50% by 202033. 
It also plans to build an innovation campus in Shanghai.
4.1. China
During just one decade, between 2001 and 2011, the trade exchange between 
the two countries increased by 430%, whereas the volume of trade between 
China and the EU increased by 380%34. China sees Germany as its most impor-
tant economic partner in Europe, and similarly Germany considers China its 
most significant partner in Asia (the fifth most important export market in 
2012), and the trade exchange between these two states has been developing 
very dynamically. According to the Unicredit bank, in 2011 Germany’s exports 
to China accounted for 0.5% of its economic growth35. Germany is the country 
of origin of half of EU exports to China, and one quarter of Chinese exports to 
the EU goes to Germany36. 
Just as in the case of other BRIC states, in China German companies sell main-
ly machines, devices, chemical products and automotive parts. For Germany, 
the Chinese market still looks promising because of the plans China has an-
nounced to change the structure of the country’s economy. For many years the 
Middle Kingdom has been accused of excessive dependence on exports; in the 
context of stagnation in the developed economies, it will have to place greater 
emphasis on the domestic market. This is why Germany can expect increased 
demand from Chinese consumers for vehicles, energy generation installations, 
environmental protection solutions and devices used in healthcare. Germany 
values its imports from China highly, as it enables them to purchase goods at 
a low price and thus curb inflation. In Germany’s trade relations with China, 
the expansion of small and medium companies on the Chinese market is par-
33 S. Hoffman, BASF globalisiert die Forschung, Handelsblatt, 30.03.2012, p. 20.
34 Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Eine strategische Partnerschaft zum bei-
derseitigen Nutzen: Monatsbericht 9/2012, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Tech-
nologie, http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/Monatsbericht/Auszuege/09-2012-I-4,-
property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 1 
35 Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Eine strategische Partnerschaft zum bei-
derseitigen Nutzen: Monatsbericht 9/2012, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Tech-
nologie, http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/Monatsbericht/Auszuege/09-2012-I-
4,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 2. 
36 H. Kundnani, J. Parello-Plesner, China and Germany: Why the emerging special relation-
ship matters for Europe, ECFR Policy Briefs, 2012, p. 1.
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ticularly positive; it contributes to a balanced increase in the two states’ trade 
exchange, and reduces the risk of major fluctuations associated with the pro-
cedures of signing contracts with state institutions. 
The total number of German companies operating in China is around 
500037. According to surveys which covered German entrepreneurs con-
ducting business in China38, the current number of German business ini-
tiatives is estimated at 4500, a major part of which (60%) were launched 
in the last decade. This was possible because a large number of small and 
medium companies have entered the Chinese market, following their major 
customers, and paved the way for others. Many German companies not only 
sell their goods on the Chinese market, but also expand and modernise their 
manufacturing plants located there, which has increased Chinese input in the 
end products manufactured by German companies to 50%. There are relatively 
few German companies which invest in China in order to export their products 
later on. The average share of exports in the total sales is around 28%. So, Chi-
na’s contribution to manufacturing activities carried out in Germany is insig-
nificant, even including the supplies of sub-assemblies. China’s WTO member-
ship has proved favourable to German companies operating in China, leading 
to a considerable reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade. Actions launched by 
the Chinese government to combat corruption have also been assessed as posi-
tive, even though the problem of corruption remains a major barrier to busi-
ness activity in China.
German companies prefer to establish their own branches instead of starting 
joint venture initiatives. In this way they intend to maintain full control over 
the business technology and know-how, possible decisions to leave the market, 
and the division of profits. Germany fears conflicts with their Chinese part-
ners, limitations in decision-making, and the risk of technology leakage. The 
decision to start a joint venture partnership on the Chinese market is often 
motivated by political factors and hopes for a stronger support for this type of 
companies by the authorities and local administration, as well as by the need 
to limit the possible losses in case of a business failure. 
37 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_2C6BB9502BB68DFB9F24F270313C3684/DE/Aussen-
politik/Laender/Laenderinfos/China/Bilateral_node.html 
38 German Business Expansion in China 2008–2010, Results of a Survey Conducted among 
German Operations in China Focussing on Market Potential Barriers to Doing Business and 
Future Business Outlook, http://www2.china.ahk.de/download/pub/sample_German-
BusinessStudy.pdf
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Germany’s largest automotive, chemical and transportation concerns, 
such as Volkswagen, Siemens, BASF, Daimler and Bayer, are operating in 
China. As part of this mutually positive cooperation, German corpora-
tions have received orders for the construction of major infrastructural 
projects in China, such as subway lines and sub-assemblies for nuclear 
power plants. For instance, China purchased a license to construct a nuclear 
reactor from Germany in 2009. In the period preceding the announcement of 
the German energy transformation plans in 2011, Siemens had been active in 
China; it had already established a joint venture company designing nuclear 
reactors. Since 2011 Germany has been implementing an ambitious plan to 
phase out nuclear energy and expand renewable energy installations at the 
same time39. Fearing a loss of face on the German market, Siemens promised 
to abandon its activities in the nuclear sector worldwide, although it cannot be 
ruled out that it will continue delivering components to Chinese nuclear power 
plants. The supply contracts are also attractive to smaller German producers, 
which for instance sell nuclear fuel production devices or construct nuclear 
reactor cooling towers40. 
In China Germany has benefited from the high recognisability of German 
brands and their good reputation. According to a survey commissioned in 2012 
by the Globeone agency, 77% of middle-class respondents appreciate German 
brands and consider their quality superior to products manufactured in Chi-
na, Japan and even the USA. It has been found that consumers do recognise 
individual brands, but are not always aware that they are German brands. The 
best known German brands are BMW, Audi, Mercedes, Siemens, Adidas and 
Bayer41.
Recently China has tried to level the asymmetrical balance of its trade relations 
with Germany. According to data compiled by the German agency Germany 
Trade & Invest, in the last couple of years China has become one of the most 
significant new investors in Germany, even though the accumulated scale of 
the investments is still small. In 2011, 160 Chinese entrepreneurs decided to 
expand their business to Germany. The second largest investor was the USA, 
39 K. Popławski, Kontekst Gospodarczo-Energetyczny w Niemiecka transformacja energetycz-
na: Trudne początki, A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż (red.), Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, War-
szawa 2012, p. 33.
40 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-
Power/#.UbBvY5yyxuM 
41 Chinesen mögen deutsche Marken, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk, Handelsblatt , 15 March 2012, p. 24.
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with 110 companies opening their branches in Germany42. China’s investments 
in Germany are still much smaller, amounting to €1.3 billion in April 2011. Also 
the number of Chinese companies operating on the German market (900) is 
much lower than the number of German companies in China. China is inter-
ested mainly in German technologies, and so far it has been waiting for 
a good moment to purchase companies from the automotive, computer, fi-
nancial and renewable energy sectors. In the period preceding the 2009 cri-
sis surge, the Chinese concern Sany invested €100 million in Germany with the 
aim of establishing a research and development centre there. Chinese compa-
nies have treated the crisis as an opportunity to purchase German companies 
active in the sectors they were interested in, and the estimated value of Ger-
man companies fell considerably. In 2011 Lenovo, China’s largest manufacturer 
of digital devices, announced its acquisition of the German electronics pro-
ducer Medion. In the same year Chinese concerns acquired two sub-contrac-
tors of the automotive companies Saargummi and Preh. In January 2012 Sany 
announced its decision to acquire the German pump producer Putzmeister 
in a transaction worth €360 million43. This came as a shock to German public 
opinion because Putzmeister had been considered an example of a traditional 
German business, a small family-owned company known as a leader in its spe-
cialist market niche. Soon after that Sany announced further acquisition plans 
in Germany. In 2012 a group of Chinese companies announced their acquisi-
tions of German businesses from the solar energy sector in which (as a result 
of German government subsidy cuts) many companies have gone bankrupt. 
German companies were among the main critics of the expansion of Chinese 
solar energy businesses, claiming that by using price dumping, the Chinese 
have pushed German producers out of the European market. In consequence, 
the European Commission has imposed duties on Chinese solar installations 
whose annual sales on the EU market has exceeded €20 billion. The German 
government has officially criticised this step, fearing China’s retaliation. In the 
end, the European Commission and China reached a consensus and agreed to 
set a minimum price for solar modules: 56 cents per watt of energy. Chinese 
companies could either join the agreement or accept a 37.2–67.9% duty on their 
products.
42 http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,821535,00.html
43 C. Bryant, Chinese Sany to acquire Putzmeister, Financial Times, 30 January 2012, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7aecad0a-4a5e-11e1-a11e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22NnV2Rp7 
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4.2. Russia
After a decline of 38% in trade exchange between Germany and Russia in 2009, 
in 2010–2011 a rapid development of trade relations was observed. In that pe-
riod German companies exported goods worth €34.5 billion to this country (an 
increase of 31%), and purchased Russian goods worth €40.9 billion (an increase 
of 28%). As in previous years, there was a deficit in Germany’s trade relations 
with Russia, this time amounting to €6.1 billion. Germany is no longer Rus-
sia’s biggest trade partner; it is currently ranked second, after China. Reports 
compiled by German exporter organisations claim that China is becoming an 
increasingly serious competitor to Germany on the Russian market 44. Russia 
is the 7th largest exporter to Germany and the 12th biggest purchaser of Ger-
man goods. The main portion of Germany’s exports to Russia are investment 
products such as machines (22.7%), vehicles (22.1%), electro-technical devices 
(6.9%) and foodstuffs (4.9%). This kind of export structure means that German 
companies have become important suppliers of technologies to Russia, which 
is particularly significant to this country in the context of the persistently low 
technical quality of Russian industrial output in the sectors in which German 
products are valued worldwide.
Above all, Russia is a very important supplier of raw materials to the German 
market. In 2011 oil accounted for 53.6% of goods delivered to Germany, natural 
gas 27.9%, metals 9.4%, and iron & steel 2.1%45. Currently Germany expects the 
importance of the Russian gas to grow in connection with the energy transfor-
mation initiative currently underway in Germany. Gas power stations are con-
sidered a good way of stabilising the German energy system, which is charac-
terised by the growing share of renewable sources of energy. So far, the rather 
non-competitive price of the Russian gas compared with other fuels has hin-
dered such tendencies. It cannot be ruled out that the federal government will 
have to reconsider its strategy of energy transformation, which currently calls 
for an increase in the capacity of gas power stations by up to 20% by 202346. 
Around 6500 German companies operate in Russia. According to estimates by 
the Eastern Committee of the German Industry Association, close to 300,000 
44 http://russland.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_russland/Dokumente/Publikationen/Jahresber-
ichte/2011/AHK-JB11-web.pdf, p. 9.
45 http://www.gcme.de/files/RCEG_GER.pdf, p. 32
46 K. Popławski, Kontekst Gospodarczo-Energetyczny…, op. cit. http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/Niemiecka_transformacja_energetyczna_trudne_poczatki.pdf 
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jobs in Germany are related to the country’s trade exchange with Russia47. In 
2011 accumulated German investments in Russia amounted to €22.2 billion, of 
which €8.8 billion were direct investments. With these figures Germany ranks 
fourth on the list of foreign investors on the Russian market, after the Neth-
erlands, Cyprus and Luxembourg. German investments have mainly been 
channelled into the food-processing industry (US$5.1 billion, 12.4% of all in-
vestments in this sector), the metallurgical sector (US$2.4 billion, 25.9% of all 
investments in this sector), and the mining industry (US$2 billion, 10.9% of all 
investments in this sector)48. 
4.3. India
The European Union is India’s important trade partner, with a volume of trade 
exchange similar to that between India and the USA. Germany is India’s most 
important partner in the EU. In 2010 Germany’s share in the overall EU exports 
was 27%, and the German imports accounted for 18% of total EU imports49. In 
2010 German exports to India amounted to €8.2 billion, and sales of machines 
and devices accounted for 31% of the total export volume. Chemical products 
were ranked second, their share in the exports to India being 13%, and elec-
tronic goods were ranked third with a share of 10%50. India exported goods 
worth €6.2 billion to Germany, with textiles accounting for 24% of the total ex-
port volume, chemical and electronic products 9.5% each, and machines 6.7%51. 
Around 1800 German companies operate in India and 240 Indian companies 
are active in Germany52. German companies employ almost 300,000 individu-
als in India, and 57% of the German investments are located in Maharashtra 
state. In late 2008 Germany was considered one of the largest investors active 
in India, carrying out investments worth €4.3 billion. Around the same period, 
India’s investments in Germany were worth €300 million. Large German pro-
47 http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/russland 
48 Russland 2011: Zwischen Aufbruch und Wirklichkeit: Jahresbericht der Deutsch-Russis-
chen Auslandshandelskammer, 2011, http://russland.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_russland/Do-
kumente/Publikationen/Jahresberichte/2011/AHK-JB11-web.pdf
49 http://www.india.diplo.de/contentblob/3420030/Daten/2221219/Wirtschaftsdaten_2011_
download.pdf 
50 http://www.india.diplo.de/Vertretung/indien/en/10__Economy/bilateral/Germany__Ex-
port__to__India.html 
51 http://www.india.diplo.de/Vertretung/indien/en/10__Economy/bilateral/India__Ex-
ports__to__Germany.html 
52 Ch. Wagner, Die deutsch-indischen Beziehungen, Note du Cerfa, Nr. 84, 2011, p. 5.
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duction companies have launched cooperation with Indian businesses. Corpo-
rations such as Bosch, BASF, Continental and Freudenburg collaborated with 
Tata Motors on the construction of the Nano car; other major German com-
panies such as SAP and Siemens have also carried out investments on the In-
dian market. German automotive concerns expect a dynamic growth of the car 
market in India, which has encouraged companies such as Volkswagen, BMW 
and Mercedes-Benz to open manufacturing plants there. 
It is worth noting that the largest German investments in recent years have 
been made in the service sector (including the insurance business), and 
the traditional German industrial sectors such as automotive and con-
struction sectors have been less popular53. Germany considers the Indian 
market particularly interesting for pharmaceutical companies because of the 
exceptionally large size of its well-educated workforce, and for energy compa-
nies due to the still underdeveloped energy infrastructure. 
4.4. Brazil
Relations between Germany and Brazil have a long history. Germany launched 
its cooperation with this country after World War II, and in the 1950s the 
first agreements facilitating trade exchange and investment activities were 
signed54. Germany is one of a group of countries which laid the foundations 
for the automotive industry in South America’s largest country, which is why 
many Brazilians still consider some German car makes as domestic55. German 
companies are able to compete on this market thanks to the high recognisabil-
ity and quality of its products. Germany appreciates the growing importance 
of Brazil not only as a location of manufacturing activities but also as an in-
creasingly significant sales market. 
In 2011 Germany was the fourth largest exporter onto the Brazilian market 
(6.7% of Brazil’s imports) and the sixth largest importer of goods from Brazil 
(3.5% of total Brazil’s exports)56. This has enabled Germany to maintain its 
53 http://www.india.diplo.de/Vertretung/indien/de/05/Direktinvestitionen.html 
54 http://www.brasil.diplo.de/Vertretung/brasilien/de/07__Aussenpolitik/Bilaterale__Ver-
traege/Bilaterale__Vertraege.html 
55 J. von Dungen, Vom Freund zum Partner: Die deutsch-brasilianischen Kulturbeziehungen im 
Wandel, Stuttgart 2013, http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/edition/brasilien_von-dungen.pdf
56 http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/MKT/2008/07/mkt20080755-
5590_ 159460.pdf 
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trade surplus and continue to export its products to Brazil, mainly vehicles 
(13.5%), chemicals (6.7%) and electro-technical products (6.7%). Germany has 
a strong position in the exports of environmental technologies to Brazil; in 
2007 Germany’s exports accounted for 18% of technologies of this type pur-
chased by Brazil, which made Germany the third largest exporter after France 
and the USA57. Brazil supplies the German market mainly with raw materials 
(39.2%), foodstuffs (26.1%) and machines (6.8%). It is thus evident that Germany 
is trying to sell highly processed goods to this country and import raw materi-
als such as steel, copper, tin and lithium, and unprocessed products58. 
Around 1200 German companies are currently operating in Brazil, and 10% of 
the country’s industrial output is produced in subsidiaries of German corpora-
tions59, employing around 250,000 individuals. Germany has mainly located its 
activities in two regions: São Paolo, with the number of German companies op-
erating there approaching 1000, and in Rio de Janeiro. Following their success 
on other developing markets, German concerns like BMW, Henkel, BASF and 
Continental have entered the Brazilian market with new projects, attracting 
German subcontractors and thus paving the way for small and medium com-
panies. According to reports compiled by the German Chamber of Commerce, 
in Brazil in 2010–2011 more and more businesspeople have become interested 
in the presence of German companies on the Brazilian market60. 
In 2011 over 100 political and economic delegations, made up of 1200 German 
entrepreneurs, visited Brazil. The result was an increase in the number of 
companies operating on the Brazilian market by 150, including large corpora-
tions such as Bertelsmann and E.ON. The largest German investments have 
been made by companies from the automotive (a Volkswagen production plant 
worth €3.4 billion), chemical (a BASF production line worth €500 million eu-
ros; an investment by the Bayer corporation worth €143 million) and energy 
sectors (E.ON’s production of energy from coal, gas and renewable sources)61. 
From the German point of view, Brazil’s main asset is the good prospects for 
energy production from renewable sources. Today this country generates 
57 http://www.ahkbrasil.com/pdf_public/Key-Facts_MAmbiental_web.pdf 
58 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/Bilaterale-Wirtschaftsbeziehun-
gen/laenderinformationen,did=490374.html 
59 http://www.wiwo.de/politik/ausland/suedamerika-deutsche-unternehmer-entdecken-
brasilien/5301968.html 
60 http://www.ahkbrasil.com/pdf_public/Jahresbericht_2011_Brasilien.pdf 
61 http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did=581520.html 
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nearly 80% of its energy in hydroelectric installations. However, due to Brazil-
ian society’s resistance to plans for constructing further hydroelectric dams, 
the government has considered increasing the use of solar power, as the coun-
try’s demand for energy is expected to double within the next 12 years. This 
is why Germany is trying to support its companies by winning contracts for 
the supply of solar technologies62. Brazil expects Germany to help it finance 
some of these investments, and so it agreed to the participation of experts from 
the German Development Aid Company (Gesellschaft für internationale Zusam-
menarbeit) as advisors in the transformation process. So far, Germany has in-
vested €900 million in loans to support these processes, hoping that this will 
make it easier for German companies to win contracts by. In spite of the dif-
ficulties associated with investing in Brazil, many German companies are con-
ducting their business on this increasingly important market. One example 
is Siemens, in whose turnover figures Brazil ranks 7th. The company hopes 
to double its financial result to over US$5 billion within 5 years. For this to be 
possible, Siemens will double its investments to US$1 billion63. German compa-
nies, just like other foreign corporations, are aware of certain limitations on 
the Brazilian market, among the most serious of which are high taxes, the wide 
fluctuations of the Brazilian currency exchange rate, and the rapidly growing 
salaries. On the other hand, Germany sees numerous assets in Brazil, which 
include its great infrastructural needs and the prospects for a rapid growth of 
the middle class.
There is growing interest on the part of Brazilian investors in expanding their 
business on the German market, as demonstrated for instance by the acquisi-
tion of steelworks in Thuringia by the Brazilian company CSN. This has been 
possible thanks to the strengthening of the Brazilian currency which has fa-
cilitated the purchase of foreign assets. Despite this trend, there has been a no-
ticeable disproportion between the scale of investments in Germany’s favour. 
Around 50 Brazilian companies operate in Germany, employing around 2000 
individuals. These companies have mainly invested in the machine building, 
steel and agricultural sectors64.
62 Frank Specht, Solarenergie: Ein neuer Boom in Südamerika?, Handelsblatt, 30 May 2012, p. 22.
63 Axel Höpner, Schwieriges Brasilien, Handelsblatt, 30 May 2012, p. 22.
64 http://www.nachhaltiger-reisen.de/news/news-detail/immer-mehr-brasilianische-fir-
men-investieren-in-deutschland/ 
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5. Problems faced by German companies operating in the BRIC 
countries
An analysis of surveys conducted among German entrepreneurs suggests 
that their main motive for entering the BRIC markets is the large potential 
of these markets. Less attention is paid to opportunities to invest in manu-
facturing plants in order to export the goods produced there, although China 
can be seen as an example here. In all BRIC countries German companies 
encounter similar problems in their everyday business. The most impor-
tant ones include corruption, bureaucracy and insufficient infrastructure. 
It seems that a considerable number of these companies have managed to 
adapt themselves to the difficult business conditions in the hope of making 
extraordinary profits. 
5.1. China
Surveys conducted by the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce show 
how German companies operating in China assess their business. 
Figure 19. German companies’ motives for entering the Chinese market
Large market 80
43
30
22
Following the customer
Low labour
and manufacturing costs
China as a platform
for expansion to other markets
[%]0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Source: German Business Expansion in China 2008-2010. Results of a Survey Conducted among German 
Operations in China Focussing on Market Potential, Barriers to Doing Business and Future Business 
Outlook, http://www.dihk-verlag.de/media/md2664D.pdf, p. 16
The survey suggests that for 80% of the respondents, the main motive for en-
tering the Chinese market was its large potential. This means that in order 
to maintain their good position in global trade, many companies have to be 
present on the Chinese market. For 43% of the respondents, the main motive 
was to follow their customers, which means that these companies have been 
forced to start business in China if they want to maintain the cooperation with 
their current customers. In most cases these are situations when subcontrac-
tors follow global German corporations. Low production costs and treating 
China as a base for expansion to other markets are other major motives, given 
by a smaller number of respondents.
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Figure 20. Features of the Chinese market considered positive by German 
companies (in %)
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Source: Author’s analysis based on ‘German Business Expansion in China 2008-2010. Results of a Survey 
Conducted among German Operations in China Focussing on Market Potential, Barriers to Doing Busi-
ness and Future Business Outlook’, http://www.dihk-verlag.de/media/md2664D.pdf, p. 20
An assessment of the business situation by German companies operating in 
China shows that the size and potential of the Chinese market are the features 
which bring the largest benefits. The role of the Chinese market in enabling 
the companies to expand to other Asian markets is also considered important. 
Even the lower level of technical standards compared with developed coun-
tries is seen as positive. Additionally, the growing level of prices and salaries 
in China is accompanied by a higher quality of products and the improved ef-
ficiency of Chinese subcontractors, which is expected to have a positive im-
pact on the competitive status of German products containing sub-assemblies 
manufactured in China.
Figure 21. Barriers to the Chinese market considered problematic (in %)
Legal protection and honouring contracts
Protection of intellectual property rights
Availability of well-educated workforce
Bureaucracy and attitude of the authorities
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Non-tariff barriers
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Source: Author’s analysis based on ‘German Business Expansion in China 2008-2010 Results of a Survey 
Conducted among German Operations in China Focussing on Market Potential, Barriers to Doing Busi-
ness and Future Business Outlook’, http://www.dihk-verlag.de/media/md2664D.pdf, p. 25
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German companies face numerous challenges in their business activity 
in China. The most frequent ones are associated with the spheres of legal 
protection, protection of intellectual property rights, the availability of 
a well-educated workforce, and bureaucracy and the attitude of the au-
thorities – these issues are reported by 75% of companies. Another difficul-
ty is corruption. Over half of the companies surveyed consider it a significant 
problem. 57% of the companies have problems with obtaining access to reliable 
market data. German companies consider that the limitation of tax reliefs, the 
appreciation of the Chinese yuan and an increase in production costs might 
have a negative impact on the business climate.
In some areas China is beginning to compete with Germany, and Germany is 
becoming ever more aware of these tendencies. One example is the statements 
by representatives of German business organisations, who have lobbied in fa-
vour of increasing credit guarantees in those regions of the world in which 
Chinese companies have been particularly active, such as Africa. Credit guar-
antees are an important instrument enabling German companies to compete 
on the market. German businesses are unable to create a system similar to the 
one created by Chinese companies in which the Chinese build infrastructure 
in African states in exchange for raw materials65. Germany fears that the con-
stantly rising level of technological advancement of Chinese products might 
challenge Germany’s position on major export markets. There is an opinion 
that it is not in Germany’s interest to unilaterally strengthen China’s techno-
logical potential and support a potential competitor. Therefore it is expected 
that in the future Germany will consent to the transferring of advanced tech-
nologies to China only on condition of greater concessions in opening the Chi-
nese market66. German companies fear that Chinese producers could challenge 
their position on global markets; for this reason they have been developing in-
novative technologies mainly in German technology centres, and do not es-
tablish advanced research centres in China. The reason might be numerous 
cases of industrial espionage and illegal copying or imitating of technologies. 
Any intensification of these trends could challenge the German technological 
advantage over China, and push German companies out of their most impor-
tant export markets. The threat seems to be all the more likely as China, just 
65 http://www.dihk.de/presse/meldungen/2012-03-23-afrika
66 Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Eine strategische Partnerschaft zum bei-
derseitigen Nutzen: Monatsbericht 9/2012, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Tech-
nologie, http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/Monatsbericht/Auszuege/09-2012-I-
4, pro perty=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 5
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like Germany, is interested in developing its industrial production – including 
in sectors in which Germany has a competitive advantage, such as machine 
production and the new technologies sectors. If Chinese producers obtained 
access to German technologies, they could quickly push Germany out of their 
markets by making use of generous state support and subsidies. Another ex-
ample of similar developments is the solar installation production sector 
which has recently declined in Germany; many leading companies have gone 
bankrupt or been acquired by Chinese investors. It appeared that the German 
government set a system of excessively high subsidies available to this sector. 
As a result, when the scale of subsidies was later limited, German companies 
lost the competitive battle to Chinese companies which have benefited from 
the considerably lower labour costs. This leads Germany to expect greater se-
curity of intellectual property and a wider opening of the Chinese market in 
exchange for the transfer of technologies to China. Members of the German 
government have consistently criticised China for limiting the imports of rare 
raw materials in 2009, and put pressure on the EU to file a complaint with the 
World Trade Organisation against China in relation to these practices67. On the 
other hand, during bilateral consultations in 2012, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
promised the Chinese government dialogue to resolve the problem of Chinese 
solar panel producers whom the European Commission had accused of resort-
ing to dumping practices68.
5.2. Russia
Germany hoped that the changes in its economic relations with Russia could 
contribute to gradual reforms in Russia. Initial attempts were made in the 
1990s, when Germany provided help in training Russian state officials, albe-
it without any measurable success. Another attempt was the partnership for 
modernisation project, but this concept was also troubled by divergent expec-
tations. Germany expected a systemic change to take place in Russia which 
could have improved the level of investment safety and facilitated business ac-
tivity, leading to the greater expansion of German companies on this market. 
Moscow, on the other hand, hoped that the cooperation would facilitate the 
transfer of technologies from the EU countries in exchange for Russian raw 
materials. This is why the project did not bring about any breakthroughs. In-
stead, it was a disappointment to both parties, and failed to encourage other 
67 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=422450.html 
68 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/aussenwirtschaft,did=510960.html 
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German companies to invest in Russia. The partnership project’s implementa-
tion was further disturbed by the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia 
and the outbreak of the global financial crisis. It seems that today German poli-
ticians no longer hope for any liberalisation of access to the Russian market, 
even after Russia joined the WTO in 2012. 
Figure 22. Barriers to the modernisation process in Russia (in %)
Bureaucracy inhibits modernisation
No comprehensive modernisation concept
No political competition
No support from the general public
Other
[%]
35
28
24
10
3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Source: AHK-Umfrage 2011
According to surveys conducted by the German Chamber of Commerce and 
Trade, German companies cannot see any major effects of the partnership for 
modernisation programme in Russia. Representatives of German businesses 
say that the entire concept is inhibited mainly by bureaucratic resistance (35% 
of the respondents), the lack of a comprehensive plan of deep reforms in Russia 
(28% of the respondents) and the lack of a strong opposition which could chal-
lenge the Russian ruling elites (24%).
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Figure 23. Areas which require reform in Russia (response scale from 1 to 5)
Limiting bureaucracy
Corruption
Custom procedures
Visa/migration procedures
Licences and permits
Technical regulations
Protectionism
Lack of workforce
Support for SMEs
Tender and procurement procedures
Financial and capital market
Pressures to locate production in RF
Tax burdens
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.7
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Source: AHK-Umfrage 2011
In the companies’ opinion, the most urgent need for reform is evident in ar-
eas such as limiting state bureaucracy, combating corruption, and simplifying 
administrative procedures. Other issues include the necessity to reform the 
education and training services, support small and medium enterprises and 
improve access to public procurement offers. 
Figure 24. What would be the impact of Russia’s WTO membership on your 
company’s business? (in %)
fairly positive
84%
negative
4%
very positive
11%
Source: AHK-Umfrage 2011
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Germany is still hoping that in the long term Russia’s WTO membership might 
improve the conditions for doing business in this country. 84% of the surveyed 
companies believe that Russia’s membership of the organisation will slightly 
improve the conditions for doing business in the long-term perspective, and 
11% feel that Russia’s WTO accession will contribute to a significant improve-
ment of the business climate. 
5.3. India
The investment climate in India is still not particularly favourable to German 
companies. According to German businesspeople, the Indian state has an ex-
cessively large influence on the investment process, which leads to a situation 
in which administrative decisions can threaten foreign investors’ plans69.
Figure 25. The greatest barriers encountered by German investors in India 
(in %)
Infrastructure
Bureaucratic barriers
Corruption
25
16
15
[%]0 5 10 15 20 25
Source: A survey among German investors conducted by AHK Indien Business Monitor 2012, http://in-
dien.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_indien/Bilder/2012_misc/Modified_IGCC_Survey_German_final.pdf 
According to German investors, India’s permanent problems (also evident in 
the other BRIC countries) are corruption, bureaucratic barriers and underde-
veloped infrastructure. Representatives of the companies surveyed believe 
that a major improvement in the conditions for conducting their business 
could be achieved with greater legal security and more efficient function-
ing of the judiciary system. Although in recent years India has largely opened 
up its market to foreign investors and eliminated some of the bureaucratic bar-
riers, only 17% of the companies surveyed have noticed a reduction in the scale 
of corruption in India. 63% of the investors believe that the scale of corruption 
has increased slightly or considerably. 48% of the companies assess the invest-
ment climate in India as positive, whereas 30% think otherwise. Almost 27% of 
the respondents see some improvement. 
69 http://library.fes.de/fulltext/stabsabteilung/00497002.htm#LOCE9E2 
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The situation of the German companies operating on the Indian market is fur-
ther complicated by the interventions in their business activities carried out 
by the Indian authorities. The case of the Enercon company has received much 
media coverage in Germany70. In 2011, in a decision issued after a trial over 
a conflict between an Indian and a German company, the Indian court invali-
dated the technological patents in the wind energy sector owned by the Ger-
man company, which forced it to withdraw from the Indian market. Another 
example of similar problems is the decision by the Indian Patent Office, which 
called on the Bayer company to disclose the composition of its anti-cancer drug 
and make it available to an Indian company producing generic drugs. The deci-
sion was taken in connection with a protest voiced by the Indian public opin-
ion over the high price of that drug set by the German corporation71. By taking 
this decision, the Indian authorities hoped that the drug price could be reduced 
by 97%72.
5.4. Brazil
Figure 26. Main motives of German companies for entering the Brazilian 
market (in %)
Better market access
Building the market position
Access to workforce
Development of newproduction lines
Cost-cutting
Improved productivity
Development of new technologies
[%]
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78.4
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45.1
39
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source: Going Global: Der deutsche Mittelstand in Brasilien 2012: Perspektiven verbessern, http://www.
roedl.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Roedl_Deutschland/Aktuelles/RP_Studie_Brasilien_web.pdf 
70 H. Hauschild, Patente, vom Winde verweht, Handelsblatt, 25 January 2011, http://www.han-
delsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/technologie-klau-in-indien-patente-vom-winde-
verweht/3764644.html 
71 Stefan Mauer, Siegfried Hofmann, Handelsblatt, 14 March 2012, p. 21.
72 Patent in Indien: Generika-Lizenz für Bayer-Krebsmittel, Handelsblatt, 4 March 2013, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/patent-in-indien-generika-lizenz-
fuer-bayer-krebsmittel-/7877394.html 
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The main motives for conducting business in Brazil listed by the German 
companies operating there include the expectation of better market access, 
strengthening of market position, and gaining improved access to the work-
force. The other factors are associated with the question of carrying out invest-
ments by expanding new production lines, cutting business costs and improv-
ing productivity. 39% of the companies surveyed pointed to the development of 
new technologies as their motive for entering the Brazilian market. 
German companies operating in Brazil can benefit from the necessity to mod-
ernise the country’s infrastructure, as this creates opportunities to sell Ger-
man investment products on the Brazilian market. On the other hand, atten-
tion is drawn to the lower productivity of the Brazilian economy compared 
with the other BRIC states, resulting from the country’s reluctance to save, as 
well as the greater fluctuations of the Brazilian currency. 
Figure 27. Barriers to the Brazilian market considered important by German 
companies (in %)
Bureaucracy
Infrastructure
Corruption
Judiciary
Crime
[%]
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Source: Going Global: Der deutsche Mittelstand in Brasilien 2012: Perspektiven verbessern, http://www.
roedl.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Roedl_Deutschland/Aktuelles/RP_Studie_Brasilien_web.pdf 
Bureaucracy is the major problem encountered by German companies active 
on the Brazilian market. This obstacle was mentioned by nearly 82% of re-
spondents. Company representatives also highlight the numerous barriers in 
the import procedures, duty and trade practices, and tax and currency settle-
ments. Another important problem is the deficiencies in infrastructure, which 
hinder business activity and the transport of goods. The remaining problems 
are connected with the continuously low level of the rule of law in Brazil, re-
sulting in a high level of corruption and crime, as well as difficulties with law 
enforcement due to the inefficient judiciary system.
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APPENDIX
Germany’s political relations with the individual BRIC states
China
Recent relations between Germany and China have been characterised by both 
countries’ willingness to intensify their cooperation. The two countries’ elites 
are becoming increasingly aware of their growing mutual dependence. 
Since the 1990s Germany has pursued a rather cautious policy towards China, 
recognising China’s potential and trying to avoid possible conflicts with Bei-
jing. Although Germany and China opened diplomatic relations in 1972, it was 
not until the 1990s that a favourable political climate for developing bilateral 
economic ties emerged. At that time Germany had already reached its major 
political goal – the reunification of the two German states – and, pressed by glo-
balisation, it had to begin the search for new markets73. Bilateral relations were 
supported by Germany’s ‘One China’ policy under which Tibet and Taiwan 
were considered parts of China’s territory74, and approval of the Chinese ‘one 
child policy’ was consistently expressed by Germany in various documents 
summing up German-Chinese political meetings. Gerhard Schröder’s visit to 
Beijing in 2004 can be seen as a symbolic beginning of more dynamic political 
cooperation in German-Chinese relations. Since then, Germany’s heads of gov-
ernment have tried to visit China at least once a year. 
The European Union, just like the United States, is a very important market 
for China; the latter has therefore tried to maintain close relations with Eu-
ropean countries. China is not fully convinced of the unanimity of the Euro-
pean standpoint, and is therefore trying to defend its own interests, by skil-
fully exploiting the open nature of the European market and the differences 
among the largest EU member states75. This makes the issue of development of 
bilateral relations with Germany particularly important for China, especially 
in the context of Germany’s growing importance in the EU since the outbreak 
of the Eurozone crisis. In its bilateral negotiations with China, Germany ex-
73 H. Kundnani, J. Parello-Plesner, China and Germany: Why the emerging special relation-
ship matters for Europe, ECFR Policy Briefs, 2012, p. 2.
74 http://www.china-botschaft.de/det/sbwl/t833145.htm 
75 J. Fox, F. Godement, The EU needs a new China Strategy, European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_fox_godement_china_power_audit_eu 
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pects its reputation as an informal EU leader to facilitate its attempts to launch 
a more effective policy towards China and create a more favourable business 
climate for German companies on the Chinese market. One example of the two 
countries’ search for common interests in global matters is their joint position 
against the introduction of limits in relation to states which have excessive 
trade surpluses, as proposed by the USA at the G20 forum in 201076. Germany 
and China, the countries with the world’s largest trade surpluses, strongly 
protested against such a move. During talks in Beijing in 2012, Chancellor An-
gela Merkel, using the opportunity to refer to good political relations, tried to 
persuade China to buy bonds from those EU countries which were at risk of 
default. This was interpreted as an initiative in which Germany acted as me-
diator in the EU’s relations with China.
As a consequence of the growing expectations of both parties, a mechanism 
for German-Chinese inter-governmental consultations was established in 
2011. Germany saw China’s consent to carrying out consultations as a confir-
mation of its position as China’s most important partner in Europe. According 
to the German Chamber of Commerce and Trade, launching a cycle of these 
regular meetings will help Germany promote its strategic interests (such as 
the improvement of economic cooperation), increase the chances to open up 
the Chinese market to German enterprises, limit the barriers to such entry, 
and facilitate talks with China on respecting European standards77. This form 
of cooperation is a novelty to China, and can be seen as an attempt to build bi-
lateral relations with the most important and attractive EU states at the cost of 
the relations with the EU as a whole. During the first inter-governmental con-
sultations with China, a project for a German-Chinese Partnership for Elec-
tromobility was announced, which suggests that Germany has far-reaching 
plans concerning the sale of green technologies on the Chinese market. The 
importance of this project is further confirmed by the involvement of several 
ministries in both Germany and in China in its implementation78. During the 
76 K. Popławski, Niemcy bronią swojego eksportowego modelu gospodarczego, BEST OSW, No. 
38 (156), Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warszawa 2010, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-
likacje/best/2010-11-17/niemcy-bronia-swojego-eksportowego-modelu-rozwoju-gospo-
darczego 
77 S. Hepperle, Regierungskonsultationen mit China, International Aktuell, Nr 05/2011, 
Deutsche Industrie- und Handelkammer, p. 2.
78 Deutsch-Chinesische gemeinsame Erklärung zur Errichtung einer strategischen Partner-
schaft für Elektromobilität, 28.06.2011, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/C-D/
china-deutsch-chinesische-strategische-partnerschaft-elektromobilitaet,property=pdf,b
ereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
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consultations, Germany referred to the ongoing trade liberalisation and the 
need to provide German companies with equal opportunities to compete on 
the market, as key elements of bilateral cooperation. The discussions conduct-
ed during meetings of working groups focused on the future of the Chinese 
market and the challenges it faces, such as demographic issues, sustainable 
development, the growing mobility of the population and urbanisation79. Ger-
many has also put forward a proposal to establish a German-Chinese Renew-
able Energy Centre.
Germany also has other forms of cooperation at its disposal in its relations 
with China. The primary institution fostering dialogue between the two states 
is the German-Chinese Mixed Economic Committee, headed by Germany’s 
Minister of Economy. The Committee is composed of several working groups 
focused on trade, investments, legal issues, coal extraction, services and the 
introduction of legal standards. The result of the committee’s work and many 
years of discussions were the recommendations concerning the creation of 
German-Chinese joint venture initiatives. Another body led by Germany’s 
Minister of Economy is the German-Chinese Technological and Economic Co-
operation Forum, which comprises working groups dealing with environmen-
tal and medical technologies, infrastructure, telecommunications and energy. 
Additionally, Germany organises initiatives aimed at creating a positive im-
age of the country in China. Giving China the status of a partner state at the 
Hanover Fair80 and declaring 2012 the Chinese Culture Year in Germany are 
two examples. Both countries will organise a Year of the Chinese and German 
Languages in the future. 
The political partnership between Germany and China seems to be evolv-
ing to an understanding under the slogan of ‘German technologies for ac-
cess to the Chinese market’. For China, Germany is an important investor 
and a supplier of technologies and know-how. The Chinese authorities greatly 
value the transfer of technologies from Germany, as it facilitates the moderni-
79 Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Eine strategische Partnerschaft zum beider-
seitigen Nutzen: Monatsbericht 9/2012, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technolo-
gie, http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/Monatsbericht/Auszuege/09-2012-I-4,pro - 
perty=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 3.
80 Gemeinsame Erklärung des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland und des Ministerium für Industrie und Informationstechnologie 
der Volksrepublik China über Chinas Auftritt als Partnerland der Hannover Messe 2012, 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/C-D/china-auftritt-partnerland-hannoverm
esse,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
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sation of their country’s economy. According to Beijing’s estimates, by April 
2011 China had approved the conclusion of over 15,000 contracts on technology 
transfer with German enterprises with a total value of US$52.12 billion81. The 
projects involved transport, electro-technology, machine building, metallurgy 
and chemistry. The selection of the sectors suggests that China, unlike many 
Western states, is determined to develop its industry, which is why it is inter-
ested in the successes achieved by German companies on foreign markets. The 
goals included in China’s 12th Five-Year plan relate to sectors in which Germa-
ny is the global leader. Germany sees that some of the goals adopted in the 2011–
2015 plan are convergent with German interests, and that it can benefit from 
China’s planned investments in green technologies and the improvement of 
energy efficiency. In the long-term perspective, the operation of German com-
panies on the Chinese market may be facilitated by currency liberalisation, 
legal amendments allowing foreign investors to open yuan bank accounts, and 
the improving economic status of the Chinese middle class. 
Russia
From Germany’s point of view its political relations with Russia are of strategic 
importance, due to Russia’s near geographical location and the two states’ close 
cooperation in the area of energy. West Germany had been one of the initia-
tors of the plan to improve relations with Russia in the Cold War period, and 
in 1955, following chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s visit to Moscow, a certain nor-
malisation of relations was achieved. 1970 can be considered the beginning of 
the creation of a framework for cooperation in the supply of raw materials. 
This was when Germany offered to deliver pipes and provide loans to construct 
pipelines from Russia to Germany. Russia’s consent to German unification had 
a positive impact on bilateral relations because Germany’s achievement of its 
strategic goal reduced the number of possible areas of conflict.
An analysis of German-Russian relations suggests that energy security has 
been a matter of key importance for Germany. The German elites believe that 
the two economies are complementary. Germany possesses rather limited de-
posits of raw materials, and Russia is an important exporter of these goods. The 
Russian market, in turn, is characterised by a high demand for the German 
technologies and industrial products necessary in the process of modernising 
the economy. The two countries’ cooperation in other spheres has been devel-
81 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgmu/ger/zt/baipishu/t833240.htm 
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oping at a slower pace. This can be concluded from the fact that Russia is less 
important for German exports, not only than the Western European countries 
but also than China or some Central European states such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Although the largest traditional branches of German industry 
and the biggest German enterprises have been able to develop their business 
activities on the Russian market, the small and medium companies’ sector has 
faced numerous problems in conducting business in Russia. The shape of the 
relationship between Germany and Russia depends not only on economic fac-
tors but also on issues of security and political cooperation. The most impor-
tant reasons for Germany maintaining its close relations with Russia include 
Germany’s recognition of Russia’s geopolitical position and its role in global is-
sues such as energy security and the political stability of the post-Soviet states 
and of the region located on the boundary between Europe and Asia.
Germany interpreted the election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president as 
the fulfilment of its expectations concerning the slowly progressing democra-
tisation process in Russia, which it hoped would be accompanied by growing 
economic liberalisation and the improvement of conditions for German com-
panies conducting their business in Russia. Vladimir Putin’s return to power 
shocked the German elites, who could not come to terms with the fact that no 
major political reforms broadening the civil freedoms could be expected in 
Russia. Since that time, certain tensions in the German-Russian relations have 
been observed, although these have had no particular impact on economic rela-
tions. In recent years Russia’s structural problems have been emphasised more 
frequently; these are connected with the risk of destabilisation of the political 
system and of the Russian economy’s excessive dependence on the exports of 
energy carriers. German politicians have consistently criticised violations of 
democratic standards in Russia. It seems, however, that due to the long his-
tory of political and economic cooperation, and the presence in both Germany 
and in Russia of numerous groups that are interested in bilateral cooperation, 
maintaining good economic relations is possible even in a situation of political 
tension. The only visible symptom of the diminishing trust of German entre-
preneurs in the Russian market has been the reduction in the scale of new Ger-
man investments. The 2009 decline of the Russian market and the sudden re-
duction in the sales of products manufactured by German companies in Russia 
have made entrepreneurs aware of the fact that the Russian market is strongly 
dependent on the economic situation in Europe, and will not offer protection 
from stagnation in the Eurozone. Investments carried out in Russia will not 
protect a business against the recession in Europe, as the economic situation in 
Russia is a reflection of the economic growth observed in the European Union, 
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which is the most important consumer of Russian raw materials. A decline in 
the economic cooperation could have been caused by the failure of the part-
nership for modernisation project, which had been ongoing since 2008, and 
called for strategic cooperation between Germany and Russia especially in ar-
eas such as the rule of law, healthcare, demography, energy efficiency, infra-
structure and education. Germany hoped that this cooperation would cause 
systemic changes in Russia which would favour German businesses and fa-
cilitate the sales of German technologies on the Russian market. From today’s 
perspective the project is considered a failure because it did not lead to any 
major changes in German-Russian relations or contribute to any improvement 
of the economic climate82. Nonetheless, it can be considered a basis for similar 
projects carried out in China and India, which will hopefully bring about more 
positive results. 
Due to the two states’ long history of political relations, the political coopera-
tion between Germany and Russia has been supported by numerous institu-
tions. Germany and Russia are participants in various forums and organisa-
tions focused on multilateral cooperation, including G8, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the NATO-Russia Council, the World 
Trade Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment. In order to intensify bilateral relations, the German-Russian Strategic 
Working Group for Economic and Financial Affairs was established in 2000, 
with the aim of stimulating the improvement of economic and legal conditions 
with a view to developing bilateral economic cooperation. The Group is com-
posed of several sub-groups which deal with individual topics of particular 
interest to German companies. In 2001 the Petersburg Dialogue, a forum for 
annual meetings between the leaders of Germany and Russia, was created. 
As part of the forum’s activities meetings of eight working groups, one of which 
deals with economic matters, are regularly organised. Additionally, since the 
late 1990s a special instrument in German-Russian inter-governmental con-
sultations has been used which facilitates communication between the gov-
ernments concerning mutual plans and expectations. The issues of bilateral 
economic relations are analysed by the German-Russian Strategic Working 
Group for Economic and Financial Affairs, headed by a secretary of state from 
the German Federal Ministry for the Economy. In 2003, the post of coordina-
tor of the German-Russian inter-society cooperation was created; since 2006 
it has been filled by Andreas Schockenhoff. The analysis of ties between Ger-
82 http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/die-deutsch-russische-mod-
ernisierungspartnerschaft-skepsis-angebracht.html 
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many and Russia should also cover the influential Eastern Committee of 
the German Industry Association, which is actively lobbying in favour 
of German-Russian interests. This institution is an important advisory body 
serving the government, and actively lobbying in favour of maintaining close 
economic relations. Germany has also used cultural policy in its relations with 
Russia; numerous German foundations and four branches of the Goethe-Insti-
tute are operating in Russia. In 2012 a Germany Year was organised in Russia, 
and 2013 is a Russia Year in Germany.
India
Relations between Germany and India were launched in 1951. The key year for 
bilateral cooperation was 1991, when India opened up its market to global part-
ners and initiated the process of liberalising the economy. In the 1990s India 
experienced an economic decline, which resulted in a rapid reduction in the 
level of reserves and led to the country’s appeal for help from the International 
Monetary Fund. The need to carry out reforms such as privatisation, currency 
liberalisation, relaxing industrial policy, lifting the limits set on foreign inves-
tors and improving the country’s financial situation was transformed into the 
basis for India’s economic success in the following years. This was when India 
also became more open to the world in political terms; as a consequence, it re-
oriented its foreign policy from the USSR to the USA83. The unification of Ger-
many came as a new impetus for the development of German-Indian relations; 
previously this cooperation had been hindered by India’s diplomatic relations 
with the GDR. However, frequent meetings between German and Indian politi-
cians at the beginning of the 1990s failed to result in any tightening of political 
or economic relations.
After many years of neglect, a new stimulus to intensify bilateral relations 
emerged in the mid-1990s, when both states filed for permanent membership 
of the UN Security Council84. Attempts to break the deadlock in mutual rela-
tions were made under the government of Chancellor Schröder, who visited 
India in 2001 and 2004. Angela Merkel decided to continue this policy, and vis-
ited India in 2007 and 2011. 
83 T. C. Schaffer, P. Mitra, Indien – Auf dem Weg zur Weltmacht, Deutsche Bank Research, 
2006, p. 3.
84 http://www.asienhaus.de/public/archiv/wagner-deutschland-indien.pdf, p. 4.
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In recent years, Germany has made numerous attempts to intensify its rela-
tions with India, including by emphasising that its relations with India are no 
less important than those with China, India’s rival in the contest for domina-
tion in Asia. Despite this, it seems that there has been no spectacular progress 
in relations between Germany and India similar to that achieved in German-
Chinese relations. Another important fact is that the history of political rela-
tions between India and Germany is not as long as in the case of the United 
Kingdom or the USA. Some analysts believe that political relations between 
Germany and the EU and India have been underprivileged due to European 
countries’ excessive focus on China85. Germany drew certain conclusions 
from such opinions, and in 2011 decided to initiate inter-governmental con-
sultations with India, so in the same year as with China. Germany seems to 
be optimistic about the chances for developing bilateral economic relations. It 
also believes that the prospects of the dynamic growth of India’s population, 
including in particular the expected development of the Indian middle class, 
currently numbering 100–150 million people, is an optimistic sign for the fu-
ture. Germany considers its cooperation with India to be especially at-
tractive in the area of scientific research, as despite its low GDP figures 
India possesses high-quality technologies, mainly in the IT services and 
biotechnology sectors. India differs from the other countries characterised 
by similar levels of economic development in that it possesses advanced tech-
nologies, and its service and new technology sectors account for a large portion 
of its GDP. For Germany this has dual consequences: on the one hand, intensive 
cooperation with India could stimulate German science and research and ini-
tiate the creation of new projects based on mutual cooperation and improved 
economic relations. Germany is trying to launch such partnership projects, as 
evidenced by the fact that the joint inter-governmental declarations have paid 
much attention to the new concepts for scientific cooperation. On the other 
hand, by constantly developing its technological sectors, India might quickly 
become a major competitor for German exporters. An example of such a threat 
is India’s dynamically growing automotive, car part and machine production 
sectors, as well as its chemical industry86. In 2005 there were 380 universities 
and 1500 research institutes in India. It is expected that in the next few years 
the number of students in India will rise, which in turn will contribute to an 
85 http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_
asien_0605.pdf, p. 3.
86 M. von Hauff, Indiens ökonomische Entwicklung, in Der Bürger in Staat: Indien, Landeszen-
tral für politische Bildung, 2009, http://www.buergerimstaat.de/34_09/indien.pdf, p. 176.
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improvement in the quality of education87. The Indian government’s plans to 
increase the share of renewable energy in the country’s energy output could 
be another business opportunity for German companies; the German govern-
ment intends to support German enterprises by developing relations with In-
dia in political, business and scientific areas88. Also, India’s plans to improve 
its energy efficiency offer a large business expansion potential to German 
companies. In a joint declaration signed in 2007 by German and Indian organi-
sations of industrial producers, cooperation in the field of green technologies 
was listed as the second most important issue in the development of bilateral 
relations, after the promotion of trade and investments. This suggests that not 
only is Germany determined to promote this cooperation, India also sees it as 
a great opportunity for its economy89. This also results from the fact that sever-
al Indian companies have been placed among the leaders in the sector of green 
technologies.
In addition to the cyclic meetings in the consultation framework, bilateral 
German-Indian economic relations are managed by the German-Indian Com-
mittee for Industrial and Economic Cooperation headed by the German Min-
ister of Economy. In 2011 a Germany Year was organised in India, continuing 
in 2013. The task of tightening German-Indian relations has been delegated to 
the Asia-Pacific Committee of the German Industry Association led until 2013 
by Peter Löscher, CEO of Siemens. The Committee is also responsible for de-
veloping Germany’s relations with China. The German Chamber of Commerce 
and Trade has opened six offices in India, and the Goethe-Institut also has six 
branches in India.
Brazil
German-Brazilian relations have a long history. In the 1950s German compa-
nies became involved in the expansion of Brazilian industry, focusing on the 
automotive industry among other sectors. In that period Germany carried 
out a large number of investments in Brazil. In the 1970s Germany had alrady 
become involved in the expansion of Brazilian nuclear power stations; there 
were plans to build eight stations, although finally only one was designed and 
87 J. Asuncion-Mund, Indien Spezial, Deutsche Bank Research, 2005, p. 5.
88 http://www.asien-pazifik-ausschuss.de/de/positionen/_download/APA-Papier-Indien.
pdf, p. 2.
89 http://www.asien-pazifik-ausschuss.de/de/positionen/_download/IndienJointBusiness-
Declaration07.pdf, p. 2.
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constructed by German companies90. In the 1990s Germany still had the status 
of a key investor on the Brazilian market, but towards the end of that decade 
Germany’s involvement was greatly limited.
Currently, after the period of less intense relations which resulted  from the 
currency crises which troubled the region in the late 1990s (among other fac-
tors), Germany now considers South America a new target in terms of its politi-
cal and economic involvement. Germany is aware of the common democratic 
values connecting it with Brazil, and considers this country an attractive part-
ner in global issues such as climate protection, the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, combating international crime, the liberalisation of global trade and 
the construction of a global financial architecture91. Brazil has long been an in-
teresting market for German companies, although its importance diminished 
considerably in the late 1990s in favour of the developing countries in Asia. 
High-ranking German politicians do not visit Brazil as often as other BRIC 
countries, nor have they proposed the initiation inter-governmental consul-
tations with this country. In 2008 only a strategic partnership agreement be-
tween German and Brazil was signed. Brazil’s good economic situation during 
the crisis, Germany’s decision to abandon nuclear energy, and Brazil’s status as 
the organiser of World Football Championships in 2014 and the Olympic Games 
in 2016 (on which the country is going to spend US$6.5 billion in investments) 
have sparked new interest in investing in Brazil among German companies. 
In the context of the Eurozone crisis, German companies and politicians have 
come to the conclusion that their activities in Brazil have so far been too lim-
ited, considering the country’s potential. A survey conducted by the German 
Chamber for Industry and Commerce, entitled Going International 2012, sug-
gests that Brazil, along with China and Russia, is becoming an interesting tar-
get market for Germany’s business expansion92. Another survey showed that 
nearly 61% of the respondents interviewed were dissatisfied with the level of 
support for their business interests offered by the German federal govern-
ment93. Chancellor Angela Merkel last visited Brazil in 2008; a year later Ger-
many hosted Brazilian president Inácio Lula da Silva, andhis successor Dilma 
90 A. Kuhn-Ossius, Atommacht – Brasilien?, http://www.dw.de/atommacht-brasilien/a-4643131 
91 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/367294/publicationFile/- 
93979/ LAK-Konzept.pdf , p. 7.
92 http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13841422/Deutsche-Firmen-mit-besten-Aussi-
chten-in-Brasilien.html 
93 http://www.roedl.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Roedl_Deutschland/Aktuelles/RP_Studie_
Brasilien_web.pdf 
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Rousseff in 2012. The year before, the then German president Christian Wulff 
visited Brazil. More visits have been paid by representatives of German federal 
ministries. Germany considers the annual German-Brazil Trade Days as an 
opportunity to further develop bilateral economic relations. For instance the 
main topic discussed at the 2011 forum was innovation and ways to improve 
it. Another sign of the growing interest on the part of German politicians in 
tightening economic relations with Brazil was the invitation to Brazil’s presi-
dent to become the main guest during Germany’s most prestigious high-tech 
fair, CeBIT organised in Hanover. During the fair President Rousseff invited 
German companies to take part in Brazil’s privatisation initiatives and public 
procurement projects concerning the construction of high-speed rail and air-
ports94. Another sign of the growing interest of both parties in strengthening 
their bilateral relations is the increased number of delegations which visited 
Brazil in 2010. In that year, around 50 delegations composed of representatives 
of various enterprises and 6 delegations composed of politicians visited Bra-
zil. This can also be seen as a response to Brazil’s intention to deepen its co-
operation with Germany95. Another indication of Germany’s preferred areas 
of interest in its relations with Brazil are the visits paid to this country by the 
German federal ministers responsible for development aid and infrastructure. 
Brazil has also hosted the German foreign minister. As can be concluded from 
the words of Germany’s foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, Germany has 
great expectations of its relations with Brazil. Westerwelle96 considers Brazil 
as Germany’s key partner in shaping globalisation, and a country Germany 
hopes to ally with on multilateral cooperation forums. Among the key areas of 
interest common to the two countries, the minister has listed climate protec-
tion, UN reforms, G20 and the global financial system. During her 2012 visit to 
Germany, the Brazilian president tried to convince Chancellor Merkel that the 
creation of rescue funds for Eurozone countries might weaken the currency 
and have a negative impact on Europe’s trade partners. She suggested that the 
possible lifting of import duties on cars sold in Brazil might depend on the level 
of the euro exchange rate. In 2012 Brazil decided to raise the import duty on 
cars manufactured abroad to at least 65%, a rise of 30 percentage points. A year 
before, due to the excessive rise in the Brazilian currency’s exchange rate, the 
94 http://www.wiwo.de/politik/ausland/suedamerika-deutsche-unternehmer-entdecken-
brasilien/5301968.html 
95 http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/vizepraesident-temer-brasilien-
wuenscht-sich-mehr-aufmerksamkeit-von-merkel/7410576.html 
96 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_09C82F2D042ACE6C8DAB3E4CC930D2C5/DE/In-
foservice/Presse/Interviews/2012/120702-BM_DieWelt.html?nn=382708 
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Brazilian government launched a wave of protectionist measures such as tax 
reliefs for Brazilian companies operating in specific sectors, as well as subsi-
dised business credits97.
Dialogue between German and Brazilian institutions has been split into in-
dividual, sector-specific topics. A joint German-Brazilian Mixed Economic 
Committee has been active since August 2008. On the German side, the 
Committee’s work is led jointly by the secretary of state at the Ministry 
of the Economy, Bernd Pfaffenbach, and a member of the management 
board of MAN Ferrostaal, Stephan Reimelt98. This composition is supposed 
to guarantee the participation of business circles in shaping the German-Bra-
zilian cooperation. The Committee’s tasks involve stimulating the intensifi-
cation of economic relations and reducing trade barriers. Another important 
task delegated to the Committee is assisting German companies in making 
contacts with Brazilian companies. The Joint Trade Days organised in 2012 by 
the German Industry Association and several Brazilian industry organisations 
under the Committee’s patronage is an example of such activities. Germany 
has openly declared that one of the that conference’s main aims was to explore 
the potential for bilateral cooperation in operations connected with the sports 
events Brazil is organising. During the conference, Germany’s economy min-
ister Philip Rösler pointed to certain protectionist tendencies reported by Ger-
man companies99. Germany co-finances eight trade fairs organised in Brazil. 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce have opened three offices in 
Brazil. 
These activities prove that Germany prefers to focus on winning contracts 
for German companies, and that Brazil is not among the strategic goals of its 
expansion. On the other hand, Germany has maintained intensive relations 
with Brazil and carried out numerous economic initiatives, so it would be rela-
tively easy to increase its involvement on the Brazilian market should better 
investment opportunities appear, e.g. in the renewable energy sector. Germa-
ny has conducted an active cultural policy in Brazil, for instance by opening 
five branches of the Goethe-Institut there. The German Office for Academic 
Exchange has granted a large number of scholarships for students who wish 
to continue their education in Germany. In 1993 around 16,000 students from 
97 A. Busch, Das schleichende Gift, Handelsblatt, 21 March 2012, p. 9.
98 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=267612.html 
99 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=495054.html 
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Brazil took part in academic programmes managed by this institution. This 
number is expected to grow by 10,000 in the near future. In 2013 a Germany 
Year will be organised in Brazil to promote German culture and tradition; in 
2014 a Brazil Year will be organised in Germany.
